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Chapter 1
Introduction
“To understand how economies work and how we can manage them
and prosper, we must pay attention to the thought patterns that
animate people’s ideas and feelings, their animal spirits.”
George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller (2009)
This thesis deals with behavioral factors that critically influence the outcomes
of organizational practices. Based on theory, we use experimental and field data
to investigate to what extent employees’ decisions are driven by psychological
motives such as emotional attachment, expectations, and fairness perceptions.
We show that behavioral mechanisms play a crucial role in determining the
consequences of organizational practices, often affecting them in unexpected
ways.
Traditional economics has evolved around the idea of an economic agent that is
rational, forward-looking, has unlimited cognitive abilities and only cares about
his own monetary payoff - the homo oeconomicus. Although researchers were
well aware early on that this concept constitutes a very simplified model of hu-
man nature, it took until the second half of the twentieth century for behavioral
economics to establish itself as a subfield of the economic discipline (Dohmen
2014). The ever-growing empirical evidence contradicting the neoclassical view
contributed significantly to the advancement of the behavioral approach, which
aims at explaining these phenomena (Dhami 2016). This new strand of litera-
ture explicitly models psychological factors as determinants of individual eco-
nomic decision-making, giving credit to heterogenous, time-inconsistent, and
other-regarding preferences, biased beliefs, as well as bounded rationality. Since
human behavior is at the heart of most questions in labor and particularly in
personnel economics, the models and methods of behavioral economics have
received increased attention in this field within recent decades (Gächter and
Fehr 2002; Charness and Kuhn 2011; List and Rasul 2011; Babcock, Congdon,
et al. 2012). When looking at micro-level interactions between employers and
employees or amongst employees respectively, the importance of psychological
factors for individual behavior becomes especially evident and cannot be ne-
glected (Dohmen 2014). Therefore, understanding the factors that influence
1
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human decision-making and accounting for this when implementing managerial
practices, is crucial for organizations.
In the following chapters, we shed some light on human reactions to manage-
rial measures. We do so by examining behavioral mechanisms that lead to
ambiguous and potentially adverse organizational effects. One channel we are
looking at is the employee’s identification with the employer. In their seminal
paper, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) are the first to introduce the concept of
identity into the individual’s utility function. Later work transfers this concept
to the organizational context and establishes identification with the employer as
a major source for employee motivation (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Besley and
Ghatak 2005). We extend the literature by considering the role of identification
in employees’ job search and wage bargaining behavior and their implications
for wage growth. Additional behavioral mechanisms we are interested in are
fairness concerns (Konow 1996; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Cappelen et al.
2007) and their implications for organizational interactions (see Fehr, Goette,
and Zehnder 2009, for an overview). Based on previous findings that show
that the acceptance of affirmative action policies depend on their perceived fair-
ness (Harrison et al. 2006; Balafoutas, Davis, and Sutter 2016; Ip, Leibbrandt,
and Vecci 2018), we study how differences in procedural fairness induced by
affirmative action and/or ex-ante disadvantages affect peer-review behavior in
competitive settings. Lastly, building on the work by Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
that introduced the concept of the fair wage-effort hypothesis, we consider the
role of training participation in fair wage expectations and its effect on sub-
sequent effort provision and productivity. All mechanisms we investigate deal
with non-standard preferences, i.e., social comparisons and social preferences
(DellaVigna 2009). The presented research, therefore, falls into the subfield of
behavioral economics that challenges the neoclassical assumption that individu-
als only take their own absolute payoff into account when deciding in economic
situations.
Our research features a mix of different methods combining theoretical argu-
ments with evidence from field and experimental data. The combination of
methods allows us to analyze a problem from different perspectives and to gather
evidence from complementary sources, thus giving a more complete picture of
the question of interest (Dhami 2016; Kampkötter and Sliwka 2016). Theoreti-
cal considerations provide a structured and mathematically formalized approach
to think about an economic problem. Furthermore, it enables the derivation
of clearly defined hypotheses with respect to the research question in focus.
Based on the theoretical foundations, empirical field data can give insights as
to whether the predicted patterns can be observed in the real world. While
field data are excellent to detect whether these patterns can be generalized to
environments where different mechanisms are at play and many forces interact,
it is often difficult to control for unobserved factors and retain clear causal evi-
dence. This is where experimental methods have their strengths (Gächter and
Fehr 2002; Dohmen 2014). Experiments can establish causal relationships by
implementing truly exogenous variation in a very controlled environment. Fur-
thermore, using these methods, researchers can collect data on a very granular
and detailed level, that can hardly be found in field data. This allows specific
behavioral mechanisms to be uncovered and is therefore particularly well suited
to test theoretical predictions (Falk and Heckman 2009; Charness and Kuhn
32011; Ludwig, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). In the following paragraphs, we
shortly summarize the contents and the individual contributions of the different
chapters.
Chapter 2 studies the role of employees’ identification with their employer as a
component of match quality for determining job satisfaction, effort provision,
job search, bargaining behavior, and resulting wage growth.1 Previous research
has mainly focused on outcomes of match quality (e.g., wage, tenure, produc-
tivity), instead of trying to explicitly measure its components. In a first step,
we analyze a stylized formal model, which integrates the emotional attachment
to the employer into the employee’s utility function. In line with previous re-
sults in the literature (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Besley and Ghatak 2005), our
theoretical framework predicts that a higher identification with the employer is
related to (i) a lower marginal utility from wages and (ii) higher work effort.
Furthermore, we consider wage bargaining behavior and identify two different
channels through which the employee’s emotional attachment can affect wage
growth. In theory, there is a trade-off between a “compensating wage differ-
ential” effect, i.e., the employer can provide lower wage growth because the
employee actually enjoys working for the employer, and a “motivation” effect,
i.e., the employer would be willing to grant higher wage growth as the employee
exerts higher effort for a given wage level. The relative bargaining position de-
termines which of the two effects dominates. When the employer’s bargaining
power is sufficiently high, the model predicts that (iii) employees with a higher
emotional attachment experience lower wage growth. This is also driven by
(iv) lower search efforts on the side of the employee and thus a lower likelihood
of obtaining an external offer. However, when the employee has obtained an
external offer, the bargaining situation reverses and an employee with higher
identification can (v) negotiate a higher wage growth since he is more valuable
to the organization.
As a second step, we test the predicted patterns using a novel employer-employee
panel dataset. We take advantage of a validated survey measure of “affective
commitment” (Meyer and Allen 1991) as a proxy for employee identification.
Consistent with our theoretical model, we find that, for committed employees,
absolute wage is significantly less predictive for job satisfaction. Additionally,
we observe that employees with higher commitment have significantly fewer
absence days and more hours of unpaid overtime, which represent our effort
measures. Moreover, higher commitment predicts a lower wage growth in the
future and is associated with a lower propensity to search for alternatives, receive
an external offer, and to quit the current employment voluntarily. However, we
also find evidence that employees can successfully exploit their higher threat
point when they have obtained an external offer, thus resulting in increased
wage growth. This relationship seems to be even more pronounced for more
committed employees.
Our research adds to the current literature by providing a theoretical frame-
work that models identification as a component of non-monetary match quality
which not only affects job satisfaction and effort provision, but also influences
job search behavior and thus wage trajectories. Furthermore, we present evi-
1Chapter 2 is joint work with Patrick Kampkötter and Dirk Sliwka and based upon Kamp-
kötter, Petters, and Sliwka (2019)
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dence for the predictive power of a validated survey measure, thereby empha-
sizing the empirical relevance of employee identification for employer-employee
relationships.
In chapter 3, we experimentally analyze the effect of quota interventions on
peer-review behavior.2 While affirmative action policies in the form of quotas
are increasingly used by regulators to promote the representation of minority
groups in leading positions in management and academia (Wallon, Bendiscioli,
and Garfinkel 2015; European Commission 2016), the scientific evidence on
the effectiveness of quota interventions remains mixed (Beaman et al. 2009;
Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund 2013; Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo 2018). Our
study gives insights into potential negative side effects and shows that quotas
can lead to distortions in subjective peer-reviews, and therefore harm the group
that is supposed to benefit from the quota.
We study the impact of a quota intervention in a situation where subjective
peer-reviews are a crucial determinant of the career advancement of an indi-
vidual. Such situations frequently arise in business environments where hiring
and promotion decisions are based on subjective evaluations by (potential) su-
pervisors or co-workers. They also play an essential role in the academic pro-
fession where peer-reviews are decisive for publication success, research funding
or tenure. Since the introduction of a quota substantially changes the com-
petitive structure within a tournament, such an intervention might also affect
peer-review behavior. On the one hand, a quota increases competition among
the group which is affirmed under the quota regime and therefore provides an
incentive for this group to evaluate other affirmed peers less favorably. On the
other hand, by design a quota favors the affirmed group over the non-affirmed
group and thus creates inequality within the tournament, which also may lead
to a reaction in peer-review behavior due to procedural fairness concerns. These
fairness concerns, however, might be mitigated depending on the justification
behind the introduction of the quota (Balafoutas, Davis, and Sutter 2016; Ip,
Leibbrandt, and Vecci 2018).
To shed light on these questions, we conduct a real-effort tournament exper-
iment, in which we randomly assign participants to affirmed or non-affirmed
types. Participants are asked to work on a creative task (Laske and Schröder
2016) and subsequently to evaluate the performance of the three other peers
within their group. The outcome of this peer-review process determines which
participants win one of two prizes. In a two-by-two design, we vary (i) whether
or not a quota is implemented and (ii) whether or not the affirmed group faces
ex-ante procedural disadvantages. When a quota is implemented, one of the two
prizes is reserved for the best-performing participant within the affirmed group.
In treatments with ex-ante inequality, affirmed participants face procedural dis-
advantages in form of a shorter working time to fulfill the task. This ex-ante
disadvantage might serve as a potential justification for the introduction of a
quota.
Our results show that quotas have a significant impact on peer-review behav-
ior. First, we find that quotas affect the overall level of peer-reviews provided.
This effect, however, depends on the perceived procedural fairness which varies
2Chapter 3 is joint work with Marina Schröder and based upon Petters and Schröder
(2019)
5between the two quota treatments. In our research design, the absolute level of
peer-reviews has no impact on tournament outcomes since both affirmed and
non-affirmed groups are affected equally. In real-life applications, though, this
might lead to negative effects on overall motivation and work climate, and might
distort evaluations when levels are compared across different environments. Sec-
ond, we show that quotas lead to systematic biases in peer-reviews against the
affirmed group. They receive significantly less favorable peer-reviews relative
to their non-affirmed peers. This second effect is not related to the perceived
procedural fairness since it remains robust across both quota treatments. In-
stead, these distortions seem to be a result of the enhanced competition among
affirmed inviduals under the quota regime as they are fully driven by peer-
reviews provided by affirmed individuals to other affirmed peers. This result
has strong implications for the effectiveness of quota interventions. Unfavor-
able peer-reviews might hinder the career advancement of the affirmed group
and thus counteract the initial goal of the the quota intervention. Lastly, we
study spillover effects of quotas on giving in an additional dictator experiment
after the conclusion of the main experiment. We find that a quota in the previ-
ous experiment significantly reduces altruistic behavior among individuals that
were affirmed before. Therefore, we provide evidence of negative spillover effects
of quotas to non-competitive environments. The results indicate that a quota
regime might actually impede the establishment of social networks and mutual
support within the affirmed group, thereby undermining another goal behind
the introduction of affirmative action.
Our research points towards negative side effects of quota interventions that
mainly affect the group which was supposed to benefit from preferential treat-
ment. Therefore governments and organizations, which seek to implement quo-
tas in order to promote minority groups, need to pay special attention to poten-
tial adverse effects of such interventions as they might render them ineffective.
Chapter 4 presents a further behavioral mechanism that impedes the initial goal
of an organizational measure.3 We study the effect of training participation
on employees’ fair wage expectations, effort provision, and finally productivity.
Firms invest in training to increase the skills and, through this, the produc-
tivity of their employees. We theoretically argue that the relationship between
an increase in skills and higher productivity might not be as clear-cut since
behavioral factors might also play a role. Given that labor productivity is de-
termined by two factors, namely skills and effort, training should increase the
employee’s skill level and thus ceteris paribus have a positive impact on produc-
tivity. Following the fair wage-effort hypothesis as introduced by Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), the second component, effort, can be described as a function of
wage relative to some “fair wage”. If the actual wage is equal to or exceeds this
fair wage, maximum effort is provided by the employee. If, however, the actual
wage falls below what is perceived as fair, the model predicts that the employee
feels unfairly treated and, as a consquence, reduces effort. We argue that the
wage the employee perceives as fair depends on the employee’s skill level and
thus is also affected by training. Therefore, we hypothesize that training not
only has a direct effect on skills, which positively affects productivity, but also
an indirect effect on effort. This indirect effect works through the adjustment of
3Chapter 4 is based upon Petters (2019)
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the fair wage, which - for a constant wage - has a negative effect on overall pro-
ductivity. Training participation can therefore cause two countervailing effects,
so that the net effect on productivity is ambiguous.
We use an extensive linked employer-employee survey dataset to study the re-
lationship between training participation and future wage expectations. In our
analyses, we apply an identification approach introduced by Leuven and Oost-
erbeek (2008). This approach exploits an alternative control group of accidental
training non-participants to account for the potential selection bias into train-
ing, which would lead to biased estimation of the training effects. To be able
to exogenously assign training and wages, as well as to explicitly measure skills,
effort, and productivity, we conduct an additional laboratory experiment. We
apply a newly developed experimental design which uses an employer-employee
gift exchange setting. Employees work for two working phases for a fixed wage
on a real-effort decoding task that benefits the employer. In the first working
phase, all employees face the same working conditions, thus serving as a form
of control phase. Thereafter, we vary (i) whether or not an employee receives
training between the two working phases, and (ii) whether or not an employee
receives a wage increase for the second working phase. Both after the first work-
ing phase and before the second working phase, we elicit a measure of the fair
wage.
The analyses of our field dataset indicate that employees hold higher future
wage expectations as a result of training participation. Our experimental re-
sults confirm this relationship and give additional insights into the behavioral
mechanisms behind training participation. We find that even though training is
effective in increasing the skills and thus productivity potential of an employee,
this does not neccessary translate into increased productivity for the employer.
Instead, our results show that trained employees negatively adjust effort both
on the extensive and intensive margin. Additional analyses reveal that, in line
with our theoretical considerations, the difference between the actual and the
perceived fair wage is a determinant of whether or not an employee releases his
productivity potential. Thus, these results indicate that fairness concerns can
impair the positive productivity effects of training.
Our results have broad implications for organizational training investments.
We show that behavioral factors play an important role in determining whether
training is effective in increasing productivity. Not accounting for these channels
might lead to lower than expected returns on training and thus result in reduced
human capital investments by firms.
The research presented in this thesis demonstrates the importance of psycholog-
ical factors for employer-employee interactions and the outcomes of managerial
measures. We show that it is critical to understand the behavioral mechanisms
at play in order to achieve the intended results and potentially take precaution-
ary actions to prevent adverse effects.
Chapter 2
Employee Identification and
Wages1
2.1 Introduction
In labor economics, it has often been stressed that an employee’s decision on
whether to stay or move to a different employer not only depends on wages,
but also on non-monetary aspects of the job match (e.g., Sullivan and To 2014).
In most of the literature, however, this “match quality” is treated as an unob-
served black box and is only proxied by directly observable outcomes such as
wages, tenure, firm size, worker skills or productivity (W. Johnson 1978; Jo-
vanovic 1979; Mortensen 1988; Bowlus 1995; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis
1999; Gaure, Røed, and Westlie 2012; Eeckhout 2018; Eeckhout and Kircher
2018). This chapter opens part of this black box by studying one important
component of match quality: employees’ emotional identification with their em-
ployer. First, we analyze a formal model in which an employee works for an
employer and is characterized by the degree to which he identifies with the in-
cumbent employer. We assume that a higher identification increases the extent
to which the employee internalizes the employer’s payoff. In line with Akerlof
and Kranton (2005) or Besley and Ghatak (2005), in such a framework, a higher
identification naturally leads to higher work efforts. Moreover, the model pre-
dicts that an employee’s well-being depends on his wage to a lesser extent when
he identifies more strongly with his employer. In a next step, we consider wage
negotiations and show that when the employer has sufficiently high bargaining
power or when there is no moral hazard problem, wages are downward slop-
ing in affective commitment. This constitutes essentially a “compensating wage
differential” effect (e.g., Rosen 1986) as well known from the literature on pub-
lic sector and non-profit motivation (Delfgaauw and Dur 2007; Delfgaauw and
Dur 2008): an employee who attaches some intrinsic value to staying with the
employer has a weaker bargaining position and thus stays with the firm at a
lower wage level. However, the picture changes when the employee has a higher
1This chapter is joint work with Patrick Kampkötter and Dirk Sliwka and based upon
Kampkötter, Petters, and Sliwka (2019)
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threat point by having obtained an external offer and chooses an unobservable
work effort. In this case, a higher identification with the firm has a higher value
for the employer2 as such an agent will exert higher efforts ex-post. In turn, a
more “committed” employee will be able to negotiate a higher wage. Hence, the
model does not make a clear prediction on the effect of employee identification
on wage growth as there are two countervailing effects. However, the model
does predict that, conditional on effort, wage growth should be downward slop-
ing in affective commitment. Additionally, conditional on having an external
offer, i.e., all bargaining power lies with the employee, more committed employ-
ees should be able to negotiate higher wages, and thus wage growth should be
upward sloping in affective commitment.
Second, to test the predictions generated by this model, we analyze a novel
linked employer-employee dataset. In order to quantify employees’ identification
with their employer, we use a standard survey measure of emotional attachment
from the literature in organizational psychology (affective organizational com-
mitment, see e.g., Meyer and Allen 1991) to predict future wage growth and
search behavior in the labor market.3 We find that (i) the predictive power of
the wage level for job satisfaction is significantly weaker for employees with a
higher affective commitment; (ii) a higher affective commitment is associated
with higher work efforts, i.e., a lower number of absence days and more unpaid
overtime; (iii) a higher affective commitment in period t predicts a lower wage
growth in t+1 ; (iv) the effect is more pronounced when we control for a mea-
sure of employee effort; (v) a higher affective commitment is associated with a
lower likelihood that an employee searches for another job, receives an external
outside offer or voluntarily quits his job with his incumbent employer; and (vi)
employees that have obtained an outside offer can negotiate significantly higher
wage growth with their incumbent employer. In addition, we find evidence that
this relationship tends to be even stronger for employees with higher affective
commitment. This indicates, that employees with higher affective commitment
are able to overcome the “compensating wage differential” effect by presenting
a higher threat point in the form of an outside offer. However, they do so less
often.
We contribute to the existing research in several ways. Even though the la-
bor economics literature has considered the quality of the job match as an
important determinant of worker satisfaction and retention (Bowlus 1995; Fer-
reira and M. Taylor 2011; Barmby, Bryson, and Eberth 2012), only few studies
have attempted to measure aspects of match quality explicitly (see Fredriks-
son, Hensvik, and Skans 2018, for an example of the latter). With our focus
on employee identification as an important non-monetary aspect of job match
quality4, we add to the discussion in labor economics and relate to concepts
2In this respect, identification underlies similar mechanisms as firm-specific human cap-
ital, which is also only valuable for the incumbent employer but not for potential external
employers, and thus has strong implications for counteroffers by the incumbent employer once
an external offer is available (see e.g., Yamaguchi 2010; Lazear 2012).
3Bömer and Steffes (2019) study supervisory support as a component of match quality,
which determines employees’ job search behavior using the same dataset.
4In contrast to rather stable cognitive skills and personality traits (or non-cognitive skills),
i.e., “personal attributes not thought to be captured by measures of abstract reasoning power”
(Heckman and Kautz 2012, p. 452), which the previous literature has identified as impor-
tant factors for labor market success (e.g., Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006), emotional
2.1. INTRODUCTION 9
discussed in the fields of behavioral economics, organizational psychology, and
management. With the emergence of the behavioral economics literature and
the consideration of social preferences in economic decision-making (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002), also the
concept of (group) identity has been introduced into the field of economics (Ak-
erlof and Kranton 2000; Akerlof and Kranton 2002; Akerlof and Kranton 2005).
Recent experimental evidence has shown that social preferences are affected by
group identity (Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and Van Winden 2002; Y. Chen and Li
2009; Goette, Huffman, and Meier 2006), i.e., the concern for the well-being of
another individual is stronger when this person shares a common group iden-
tity. In the context of organizations, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) stress the
importance of employees’ identification for work motivation. In line with this
reasoning, Besley and Ghatak (2005) argue that organizations benefit when em-
ployees share their mission (see also Francois 2000; Glazer 2004; Delfgaauw and
Dur 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur 2008). Several recent contributions provide em-
pirical evidence supporting this view (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2015; Burbano
2016; Carpenter and Gong 2016; Cassar 2019). While the mission match be-
tween employer and employees specifically refers to the channel of overlapping
preferences towards a higher non-monetary goal, identification can be defined
in a broader context. Mission alignment, thus, can be understood as one mech-
anism that may evoke identification with the employer. Based on the theory of
psychological needs by Deci and Ryan (2000), Cassar and Meier (2018) apply
the concept of self-determination theory to the organizational context and define
“meaning of work” along the four dimensions mission, autonomy, competence,
and relatedness. They describe relatedness as a feeling of connectedness to the
organization and its members, thus this dimension of meaning of work closely
relates to our understanding of identification.
To capture identification in the empirical part of this chapter, we make use of the
widely applied and validated survey measure of “affective commitment”. The
notion of “affective commitment”, which describes the strength of the emotional
attachment of an employee to the employer, has first been considered in the field
of organizational psychology.5 A large body of evidence (see e.g., Meyer and
Allen 1984; Tett and Meyer 1993; Rhoades, Eisenberger, and Armeli 2001) has
shown that employees differ in the extent to which they feel attached to the
organization and that such “affective commitment” is generally considered to
be the most important dimension to predict individual turnover (intention),
job performance, and absenteeism (see Meyer, Stanley, et al. 2002, for a meta-
analysis).
We contribute to this literature by analyzing the relationship between identifica-
tion and job satisfaction, effort provision, wage growth, job search behavior, and
employee mobility6, both in a theoretical model and with field data. We provide
attachment can be viewed as a match-specific component. This means that an individual’s
affective commitment is typically rather stable within an organization, but is likely to vary in
a different job match at a different employer.
5In a very influential contribution, Meyer and Allen (1991) argue that an employee’s ”or-
ganizational commitment”, i.e., the individual’s psychological attachment to the organization,
consists of three components. Besides affective commitment, the other components are “con-
tinuance commitment” as the awareness of the costs associated with leaving the organization
and “normative commitment” as the feeling of obligation to continue the employment.
6Kampkötter and Sliwka (2014) show that incumbent employees with high levels of firm
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empirical evidence from a representative linked employer-employee dataset that
not only provides ample information on individual characteristics, attitudes, and
labor market outcomes, but also detailed knowledge of specific job search be-
havior and outcomes, which previous datasets typically lack. This allows us to
study the nexus between commitment to an employer and the job matching pro-
cess in more detail. Additionally, we present evidence for the predictive power
of a self-reported survey measure of identification for actual wage trajectories
and turnover outcomes, and thereby contribute to the recently emerging litera-
ture which emphasizes the relevance of validated survey measures for economic
behavior and decision-making (Blinder and Krueger 2013; Bender, Bloom, et al.
2018; Falk and Hermle 2018; Falk, A. Becker, et al. 2018).
2.2 The Model
Consider the following simple model to illustrate the key ideas. An employee
works for two periods t = 0, 1. In period 0, the employee is hired by a firm. The
employee’s utility function in period t is
U (piWt, piFt) = piWt + γpiFt,
where piWt is the material well-being of the employee and piFt are the profits
of the employer. Let γ be a measure of the employee’s identification with the
employer or his “affective commitment” towards the employer: the higher γ, the
greater the extent to which the employee internalizes the employer’s well-being.
Employee and employer learn the realization of γ after the employee is hired in
period 0. The employee is initially hired at a market wage w0 = wM . In period
1, the employee and the firm negotiate the wage w1 and the bargaining outcome
is determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where the employee
has bargaining power λ. In each period, the employee chooses a work effort
a which generates a profit piFt = K (at) − wt for the employer and a material
well-being piWt = wt− c (at) for the employee with Ka, ca, caa > 0 and Kaa ≤ 0.
2.2.1 Analysis
The employee’s utility in a period t is thus
wt − c (at) + γ (K (at)− wt)
and the employee chooses an effort such that
γK ′ (at)− c′ (at) = 0 (2.1)
which implicitly defines his effort a (γ) such that
∂a (γ)
∂γ
= − K
′ (a)
γK ′′ (a)− c′′ (a) > 0
and this implies the following simple first result:
tenure have lower wages compared to newly hired employees in the same position arguing
that the fact that these employees did not leave the firm in the past indicated higher mobility
costs (which also capture some non-monetary elements such as affective commitment to the
incumbent employer), which weakens their bargaining position.
2.2. THE MODEL 11
Proposition 1 When the employee exhibits a stronger identification with the
employer, (i) his marginal utility from wages is lower and (ii) his work effort is
higher.
Note that this corresponds to typical results in the literature on employee iden-
tification (Akerlof and Kranton 2005), mission motivation (Besley and Ghatak
2005; Cassar 2019), or public sector and non-profit motivation (Delfgaauw and
Dur 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur 2008): The well-being of an employee with a
higher identification with the employer depends on his wage level to a lesser
extent. Moreover, as he internalizes the employer’s output to a greater extent,
such an employee will work harder.
2.2.2 Wage Bargaining
In a next step, we analyze the wage bargaining outcome in period 1 and the
resulting change in wages between periods 0 and 1. The employee’s utility when
staying with the firm is
(1− γ)w1 + γK (a (γ))− c (a (γ))
and his threat point utility is equal to uM .7 The employer’s utility when the
employee stays is
K (a (γ))− w1
and we normalize the employer’s threat point utility to 0.8 Note that the agent
stays with the firm if there are gains from trade, i.e., a wage level exists in which
both the firm and the agent are better off when the agent stays, which will be
the case if
K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)) ≥ uM .
In this case, we apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to obtain the
rate of wage growth:9
Proposition 2 When K (a (γ)) − c (a (γ)) > uM the employee stays with the
firm and his wage increases by
∆ (γ, a) = w1
w0
=
λK (a (γ)) + (1− λ) uM−(γK(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))(1−γ)
wM
. (2.2)
Conditional on effort a, wage growth is downward sloping in γ, i.e.,
∂∆ (γ, a)
∂γ
< 0.
7If the worker does not know the level of identification realized in a different job and has
some beliefs about the realization of emotional attachment at the new employer, uM is, for
instance, equal to Eγ [(1− γ)wM + γK (a (γ))− c (a (γ))].
8This is, for instance, the case in a competitive labor market where wM = Eγ [K (a (γ))] .
9Note that here we characterize the relative wage growth as this is what we will explore
empirically in the subsequent section.
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When efforts are endogenous, then
∂∆ (γ, a (γ))
∂γ
= λ
wM
K ′ (a (γ)) a′ (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (1− λ) uM − (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))
wM (1− γ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
When the employer has some bargaining power (0 < λ < 1), there is a trade-
off between a “compensating wage differential” effect and a “motivation” effect.
Wage increases are downward sloping in the employee’s degree of identification
with the employer if, and only if, the employee’s bargaining power is sufficiently
small.
Proof: See the appendix to chapter 2.
Hence, there are two effects. On the one hand, there is a “compensating wage
differential” effect: The employer can push committed employees to a lower
wage as they enjoy working for the firm – and this joy will be lost when the
employee leaves his incumbent employer. But, on the other hand, there is also
a countervailing “motivation effect”: When efforts are endogenous, committed
employees work harder and are therefore more valuable for their incumbent em-
ployer, allowing them to reap part of this value in negotiations. Conditional on
efforts, wage growth is thus downward sloping in γ. However, the net effect of af-
fective commitment on wage growth is ambiguous when efforts are endogenous.
When the employee has a strong bargaining power, the motivation effect domi-
nates and wage growth is upward sloping in affective commitment. If, however,
the employee’s bargaining power is sufficiently small, the compensating wage
differential effect is stronger and wage growth is downward sloping in affective
commitment.
2.2.3 Job Search and External Offers
Now we consider an employee’s effort to search for a new job. Assume now
that before period 1, the worker can choose a search effort p at cost k (p) with
kp, kpp > 0. This search effort determines the likelihood of receiving an outside
offer generating utility uO that may improve his outside option. The worker’s
search is successful (d = 1) with probability p. In this case, the new outside
option is drawn from a probability distribution with pdf f (uO) on the support
]uM ,∞[. If the search is not successful (d = 0), the outside option remains uM .
When the worker receives the external offer, he thus either negotiates a higher
wage or leaves the firm obtaining a utility uO. He will again stay with the firm if
there are gains from trade, i.e., K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)) > uO. The negotiated wage
increase when he stays is again determined by Nash bargaining analogously to
Proposition 2 and thus will be equal to
∆ (uO) =
λK (a (γ)) + (1− λ) uO−(γK(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))(1−γ)
wM
.
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The outside offer will thus increase the agent’s wage by (1−λ)(1−γ) (uO − uM ) and
utility by (1− λ)(uO − uM ) when staying. But if uO is sufficiently large, the
employee leaves the firm and his utility then increases by
uO − [(1− λ)wM + λ (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))] .
Hence, the expected utility gain from obtaining an external offer is
E [∆u] =
∫ K(a(γ))−c(a(γ))
uM
(1− λ) (uO − uM ) f (uO) duO
+
∫ ∞
K(a(γ))−c(a(γ))
(uO − (1− λ)wM − λ (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))) f (uO) duO
which determines the worker’s optimal search effort. We can show:
Proposition 3 If the employee obtains an external offer d providing utility
uO > uM , he will stay with the firm if K (a (γ)) − c (a (γ)) > uO. In this case
the worker’s expected wage increase conditional on the offer d is
E [4| d] =
λK (a (γ)) + (1− λ) uM−(γK(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))(1−γ)
wM
(2.3)
+d · (1− λ)(1− γ)
(
E [uO|uO ≤ K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))]− uM
wM
)
(2.4)
The stronger the employee’s identification with the firm γ, the larger is the wage
growth the agent achieves when having obtained an external offer. A stronger
employee identification, however, reduces the employee’s search effort and thus
the likelihood that he leaves the firm.
Proof: See the appendix to chapter 2.
As we have seen before, without an external offer, wages may increase to a lesser
extent for more emotionally attached workers (when either their bargaining
power λ is small or when efforts are held constant). However, as the result shows,
once the worker has obtained an external offer but stays with the employer, there
is always a countervailing effect. To see this, note that
E [4| d = 1]−E [4| d = 0] = (1− λ)(1− γ)
(
E [uO|uO ≤ K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))]− uM
wM
)
is strictly increasing in γ. Hence, an external wage offer comes along with higher
wage increases for more emotionally attached workers. The reason is twofold:
First, the firm matches higher wage offers when a worker is more emotionally at-
tached as such workers are more productive, i.e., E [uO|uO ≤ K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))]
is increasing in γ. But moreover, as such a worker’s utility is less sensitive to
money, the firm has to raise the worker’s wage by a greater extent to match the
higher threat point resulting from the external offer.10
10Note that the utility increase obtained through an external offer does not depend on γ
when the worker stays.
14 CHAPTER 2. EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION AND WAGES
The question naturally arises why an employee with a higher γ exerts lower
search efforts. The reason is that with positive probability, the utility provided
by the external offer uO is so large that the worker leaves the firm. But for more
attached workers this is less likely, as such workers have a higher productivity,
i.e., K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)) is larger. Moreover, if such workers leave, their utility
gain from moving is smaller as they lose the psychological benefit of the larger
emotional attachment. Thus, it may be that an employee with a higher emo-
tional attachment to the firm will have a lower wage growth without an external
offer, but achieves a higher wage growth once having obtained an external offer.
2.2.4 Predicted Patterns
Our model takes the strength of the employees’ emotional attachment to the
employer as given and derives predictions for the future employer-employee re-
lationship and behavior. Note that we do not aim at identifying causal effects
of employee identification with the employer, but rather use our formal model
to describe qualitative characteristics of the conditional expectation function
of future wage growth, work efforts, and search activities, conditional on the
degree of employee identification. The following stylized expected patterns sum
up our theoretical results: A stronger identification of an employee with the
employer predicts
• a lower marginal utility from wages:
∂E [u (w, γ) |w, γ ]
∂w∂γ
< 0,
• higher work effort:
∂E [a |γ ]
∂γ
> 0,
• a lower wage growth (conditional on work effort):
∂E [4|γ, a ]
∂γ
< 0,
• lower search efforts and a lower likelihood of obtaining an external wage
offer:
∂E [p |γ ]
∂γ
< 0.
• a higher wage growth when having obtained an external offer
∂ (E [4|γ, d = 1]− E [4|γ, d = 0])
∂γ
> 0.
We test these patterns empirically using a representative matched employer-
employee panel dataset.
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2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on the first three waves of the Linked Personnel
Panel (LPP), an employer-employee panel dataset that has been developed by
the authors jointly with the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)
Mannheim and the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) Nuremberg on
behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Labor (BMAS). The LPP is a linked
employer-employee dataset that is representative for German private sector es-
tablishments with more than 50 employees subject to social security contribu-
tions (see Kampkötter, Mohrenweiser, et al. 2016, for details on the construction
and design of the dataset).11 The employer survey is based on a subsample of
the IAB Establishment Panel and is stratified according to four employment
classes (50-99; 100-249; 250-499; 500 and more employees), five industries (met-
alworking and electronic industries; further manufacturing industries; retail and
transport; services for firms; information and communication services) and four
regions of Germany (North; East; South; West). The sample comprises 1,219 es-
tablishments in the first wave (2012/13), 771 in the second wave (2014/15) and
846 in the third wave (2016/17) and is representative for the above-mentioned
establishment characteristics. A random sample of employees was drawn from
participating establishments in each wave to take part in at home telephone
interviews (CATI). The employee survey was carried out in 2012/13 (first wave)
comprising 7,508 employees, in 2014/15 (second wave) comprising 7,109 em-
ployees, and in 2016/17 (third wave) comprising 6,428 employees.
Besides information on the workforce structure and composition, employee rep-
resentation, ownership, legal structure and establishment-level performance mea-
sures originating from the IAB establishment panel, the LPP employer survey
focuses on human resource management practices in firms in more detail. The
employee survey includes a rich set of items on socio-demographic characteristics
and detailed survey scales to assess job characteristics, personal characteristics,
attitudes, and behavioral outcome variables.
Our main independent variable is affective commitment to the organization.
This is a psychological construct that is widely used in organizational psychology
and management research which captures an employee’s emotional attachment
to or identification with his employer. The dataset includes a six-item short scale
by Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993). This construct is a reduced but embedded
scale of the original version introduced by Allen and Meyer (1990). Items were
measured on a five-point Likert scale and show a high level of scale reliability
with a value of Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83. The six items read as follows: “I
would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization”,
“This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me”, “I really feel
as if this organization’s problems are my own”, “I do not feel a strong sense
of ’belonging’ to my organization”, “I do not feel ’emotionally attached’ to this
organization”, “I do not feel like ’part of the family’ at my organization”.12 The
mean and median for this construct (unstandardized) range around 3.7 and 3.8
in both the first and the second wave.
11This study uses the Linked Personnel Panel (LPP), wave 1617,
http://dx.doi.org/10.5164/IAB.LPP1617.de.en.v1
12The latter three items are reverse coded.
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Further survey variables we use are job and pay satisfaction, which are mea-
sured on an 11-point Likert scale adapted from the German Socio-economic
Panel Study from zero to ten with a mean of 7.5 and 7.6 (median 8) and 6.7
and 6.8 (median 7) in the first and second wave, respectively. Both commitment
and job satisfaction are standardized with zero mean and unit variance before
entering the regressions. Furthermore, we use the number of sick days within a
year and the hours of unpaid overtime per week reported by the employees as
proxies for effort within our analyses. Additional individual-level control vari-
ables include job status (blue collar vs. white collar), supervisory position, part
time, gender, secondary and tertiary education, age, gross hourly wage, limited
work contract, marital status, and household size. The set of establishment-level
controls comprises industry, region, establishment size, ownership structure, and
independent establishment. In table 2.6 in the appendix to this chapter, we pro-
vide an overview of the descriptive statistics of all the relevant variables on the
employee and establishment level we use in our regressions.
Hourly wage growth is measured as annual change in hourly wages from the first
to the second wave and the second to the third wave respectively (measured
in percent).13 In order to discard data outliers, we winsorize this variable at
the 1% level in each tail. Average hourly wage growth equals 8.2 and 5.6%
respectively within the time span of two years, the median hourly wage growth
ranges comparably lower at 6.7 and 3.9%. Active job search is defined as dummy
variable with value 1 if an employee has actively searched for a job in the 12
months prior to being surveyed. Job offer is a dummy variable coded 1 if an
employee has been approached by another employer within the 12 months prior
to the interview and has, as a consequence of the poaching behavior, received a
specific job offer, and 0 otherwise (no job offer received and not being approached
by an employer). Realized voluntary turnover is coded as 1 if the reason for the
realized job change is voluntary, i.e., a termination by the employee itself and 0
if the employee is still with his incumbent employer.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Job Satisfaction, Wages, and Affective Commitment
In order to test our first stylized prediction, we regress job satisfaction in period
t+1 on hourly wage in t+1, commitment in t and the interaction of both.
The key idea of our first analysis is that we take job satisfaction as a measure
of employee well-being and test the prediction that for employees with high
affective commitment, the conditional expectation of their well-being is less
dependent on their wages.
13Most of the predicted patterns from our theory section, which we will analyze empirically
in the following, refer to changes between period t and t + 1 or outcomes in t + 1 based on
variables in t. Therefore, given the structure of our data, t either refers to the first wave in
2012/13 or the second wave in 2014/15 and t + 1 to the second wave in 2014/15 or the third
wave in 2016/17 respectively. Thus, the difference between t and t + 1 always relates to a
two-year window. This also implies that the data from the third wave, in most of our analyses,
will only be used to construct our dependent variables, but not as predictor variables.
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In the first specification of table 2.1, we analyze pooled cross-sectional data from
all three waves without any additional controls. In the second specification, we
add employee and establishment characteristics. In specification (3), we include
establishment fixed effects and in specification (4) employee fixed effects. The
results show that total hourly wage is positively associated with job satisfaction
but that the economic magnitude is small. This result mirrors findings from
previous work (see e.g., Clark and Oswald 1996), where the absolute wage level
also played a minor role for the prediction of job satisfaction. In line with our
first stylized prediction, the coefficient for the interaction term between affective
commitment and hourly wage has a negative sign. Thus, indicating that the
conditional expectation function of job satisfaction has a weaker slope with
respect to wages for employees who exhibit a stronger emotional attachment
towards their employer. The size of the interaction term roughly corresponds to
about 40 to 60% of the size of the wage coefficient in all three specifications, i.e.,
for a person with an affective commitment that is about 1.5 standard deviations
above the mean, wages are not predictive for job satisfaction while the predictive
power of wages for satisfaction is much higher for less emotionally attached
workers. The interaction term remains statistically significant when we include
establishment fixed effects. When we include worker fixed effects, the point
estimate still shows a positive relationship but is no longer significant.
Table 2.1: Job Satisfaction and commitment
Dependent variable Job satisfactiont+1(std.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hourly waget+1(wins.) 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.021**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
Commitmentt(std.) 0.433*** 0.488*** 0.438*** 0.112
(0.046) (0.047) (0.060) (0.132)
Commitmentt(std.) * -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.008
Hourly waget+1(wins.) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Constant -0.202*** -0.176 -0.293 -1.039**
(0.046) (0.110) (0.242) (0.510)
Observations 3,450 3,237 3,237 3,237
Number of clusters 613 583 583 583
R-squared (within) 0.128 0.168 0.362 0.057
Employee & establ. controls No Yes Yes Yes
Establishment fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Employee fixed effects No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on establishments in parentheses. Control variables on
employee level include: blue collar, supervisory position, part time, female, secondary and tertiary
education, age, limited work contract, marital status, household size, and year dummies. Control
variables on establishment level include: industry, region, establishment size, ownership structure,
and independent establishment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2.4.2 A Proxy for Work Effort
The second stylized prediction refers to the relationship between affective com-
mitment and work effort in the same year. Since work effort is hard to measure
across a broad number of firms, we use the number of sick days within a year and
the amount of unpaid overtime hours per week, which essentially constitutes a
gift to the employer, as two alternative proxies for work effort (see e.g., Engel-
landt and Ribhahn 2011). In table 2.2, we first analyze the pooled cross-section
and then gradually include employee and establishment controls as well as estab-
lishment and employee fixed effects. Again, all specifications show the expected
sign, i.e., more committed employees take fewer sick days (specifications (1) to
(4)) and work, on average, more overtime (specifications (5) to (8)). We find
that employees with a one standard deviation higher affective commitment are,
on average, two days less absent. This result is robust to the inclusion of estab-
lishment fixed effects, however, it becomes smaller and statistically insignificant
when we apply employee fixed effects.14 With respect to unpaid overtime, the
analyses show that employees with a higher commitment of one standard de-
viation work between 0.07 and 0.2 hours per week more overtime compared to
their counterparts with lower affective commitment. For both effort proxies, the
coefficients correspond to about a 10% higher effort provision for a one standard
deviation higher affective commitment compared to the respective mean values
(see table 2.6 in the appendix to this chapter).
14This may be due to the fact that affective commitment is rather stable over time such that
there is little within person variation: The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.65 (p<0.0001)
for affective commitment in t and t+1 and 0.60 (p<0.0001) for affective commitment in t and
t+2. Moreover, measurement error may lead to attenuation bias.
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2.4.3 Predicting Wage Growth
In the following section, we study the extent to which affective commitment as
measured in period t predicts actual wage growth between t and t+1. Again,
note that t either refers to the first wave in 2012/13 or the second wave in
2014/15 and t+1 to the second wave in 2014/15 or the third wave in 2016/17
respectively. Hence, wage growth is always calculated over a period of two years.
Recall that without information on the employee’s bargaining power, our model
makes no prediction on the sign of the slope of the conditional expectation func-
tion of wage growth between t and t+1 as a function of affective commitment γ
as measured in t. However, it predicts that the slope should be negative when
we condition on work effort a
∂E [∆ |γ, a ]
∂γ
< 0.
As a first step, we descriptively explore the connection between affective com-
mitment in period t and wage growth between t and t+1. Figure 2.1 shows mean
wage growth when using a median split of all workers in the sample by their
level of affective commitment, both pooled across all waves as well as separately
for wage growth from 2012/13 to 2014/15 and 2014/15 to 2016/17. The figure
already indicates a sizeable compensating wage differential effect: Employees
with above median levels of affective commitment exhibit a substantially lower
wage growth.
Figure 2.1: Wage growth for employees by degree of affective commitment
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The corresponding regression results are reported in table 2.3. As before, we
first include employee and establishment controls, before we show the results
with establishment and employee fixed effects. In the specifications reported in
columns (5) to (8), we additionally control for our two proxies for work effort
(sick days and unpaid overtime).
First, note that the coefficient of affective commitment is negative in all speci-
fications, indicating that employees with higher levels of affective commitment
experience lower wage growth. Hence, the compensating wage differential effect
seems to dominate the motivation effect. Second, the coefficient becomes more
negative and remains (weakly) statistically significant throughout all specifica-
tions when we control for effort proxies. This result is in line with the idea that
the conditional expectation function is downward sloping in affective commit-
ment conditional on effort. The point estimates indicate that a person with a
one standard deviation higher affective commitment faces a 1 to almost 3 per-
centage points lower wage growth. As average wage growth between two waves
in the sample is about 7 percent, this constitutes a sizeable effect of about 12
to 40% lower wage growth for such employees.15
15Work engagement is often used as an alternative measure of effort in the literature. As
a robustness check, table 2.7 in the appendix to this chapter uses work engagement as an
additional control variable when regressing wage growth on commitment. In the LPP, we
operationalize work engagement with the nine-item short scale of the Utrecht Work Engage-
ment Scale (Schaufeli et al. 2002), measured on a five-point Likert scale. The results remain
robust and become even slightly more significant, but we caution that some of this may be
due to correlated measurement error in the two constructs. As an additional falsification
check, table 2.8 in the appendix to this chapter regresses wage growth on work engagement
instead of commitment. Even though these two measures are highly correlated (Pearson cor-
relation coefficient: 0.49, p<0.0001), all regression coefficients for engagement are statistically
insignificant showing that affective commitment rather than work engagement is driving our
results.
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2.4.4 Job Search and Turnover
In this section, we present empirical evidence for our prediction with respect
to job search behavior and outcomes of the search process. We estimate probit
regressions to study the relationship between commitment, our effort proxies,
satisfaction with pay in period t, and the propensity to engage in active job
search, receipts of external offers, and realized voluntary turnover in t+1. Table
2.4 reports marginal effects for the three different dependent variables.
Specifications (1) and (2) show that more committed employees indeed exhibit
a lower probability to actively engage in search for alternative employment op-
portunities in the future. The coefficient is robust to the inclusion of additional
explanatory variables and indicates that employees with a one standard devi-
ation higher commitment have, on average, a 5 to 7 percentage points lower
propensity to actively search for alternative employment offers. Again, this is a
sizeable difference: As the baseline likelihood that somebody actively looks for
a new job is 25% in the sample, this likelihood is, thus, nearly 30% lower for
employees with an affective commitment that is one standard deviation above
the mean.
As a potential consequence, we also find that employees with higher commitment
have a lower likelihood to receive external job offers. Both specifications (3)
and (4) show that employees with affective commitment that is one standard
deviation above the mean, have around 2 percentage points lower propensity
to receive an external offer. Given that the average likelihood to receive an
external offer within our dataset is around 9%, this corresponds to a reduction
of around 20%.
Furthermore, with respect to realized voluntary turnover, we consistently find
that employees with higher levels of commitment exhibit a significantly lower
probability to quit their current job voluntarily. The average turnover rate in
our sample is 2%, which is reduced by around 1 percentage point, i.e., by 40 to
50%, for employees with an affective commitment that is one standard deviation
above the mean.16
16As previous research in psychology has shown that personality traits are predictive of
turnover decisions (see e.g., Zimmerman 2008) and may be correlated with affective commit-
ment, we also include the Big5 personality traits as additional control variables in table 2.10
in the appendix to this chapter. All of our results remain robust.
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2.4.5 Wage Growth with External Offer
Finally, we study the relationship between affective commitment in t and hourly
wage growth between t and t+1, conditional on having obtained an external
offer in t+1. In other words, we investigate to what extent the wage increase
that an employee has obtained after an external offer depends on the employee’s
affective commitment. Recall that our formal model predicts that external offers
should be associated with higher wage increases for more emotionally attached
workers.
We regress the hourly wage growth between t and t+1 on commitment in t,
a dummy variable indicating whether an employee received an outside offer in
t+1, and the interaction of the two. In specifications (1) to (3), we stepwise
include employee and establishment controls, as well as establishment fixed ef-
fects. In specifications (4) to (6), we additionally control for our effort proxies.
First of all, we find that when an employee received an external offer, the as-
sociated wage growth with his incumbent employer is around four percentage
points higher compared to employees without an external offer. As average wage
growth within our dataset is around 7 percent, this corresponds to between 55
and 63% higher wage growth for employees that have received an external offer.
The coefficient of the interaction term with affective commitment has the ex-
pected sign, indicating that highly committed employees are able to reap some
of the value they generate for the employer in wage negotiations when they
have an external offer. However, the interaction term is significant in only one
specification.17
17Table 2.9 in the appendix to this chapter shows the relationship between affective commit-
ment and the wages offered by an external employer. While we only have very few observations
(around 100) to study this question, the point estimates indicate that conditional on having
obtained an external offer, employees with higher commitment get offered significantly higher
wages on the market compared to candidates with lower affective commitment.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied a stylized theoretical model to analyze the effect of
emotional attachment of an employee to the employer on wage bargaining and
search behavior. The model predicted several patterns that we investigated em-
pirically using a novel, representative matched employer-employee panel dataset.
In particular, the model predicts that higher affective commitment has two
countervailing effects. On the one hand, the employer can exploit the emotional
attachment by offering lower wage growth. On the other hand, an agent with
a higher emotional attachment exerts higher efforts and is thus more valuable
for the employer. The employee’s bargaining position in the wage negotiations
determines which of the two effects dominates.
Previous literature has identified on-the-job search and subsequent wage bar-
gaining (including external offers) with the incumbent employer as the main
source for rapid wage growth (Greenwald 1986; Golan 2005; Barron, Berger,
and D. Black 2006; Yamaguchi 2010; Bagger et al. 2014). Our model integrates
identification with the incumbent employer as a non-monetary determinant of
employee’s utility. We predict that the employee’s emotional attachment to the
employer, thus, affects effort choice and that highly committed employees will,
on average, experience lower wage growth. Furthermore, a more committed em-
ployee will be less willing to invest in costly search for alternative employment
opportunities, therefore the employee will be less likely to receive external offers,
and finally have a lower tendency to switch employers. However, when highly
committed employees have obtained an external offer from an outside employer,
they tend to be able to negotiate higher wages with their incumbent employer
as they are more valuable to them.
In our empirical analysis, we find that a widely applied, short survey scale mea-
suring an employee’s “affective commitment” towards the employer has sub-
stantial predictive power for on-the-job search and future wage growth. Our
empirical results show that more committed workers experience sizeably lower
wage growth in subsequent years compared to less committed workers. We ad-
ditionally find evidence for lower investments into on-the-job search by high
commitment workers, and a lower likelihood of receiving an external offer and
leaving the incumbent employer. In line with our model, our data indicate that
conditional on having obtained an external offer, employees who reported a
higher commitment with their incumbent employer, can overcome this negative
“compensating wage differential” effect.
Of course, we have to caution that affective commitment is not exogenously
assigned in our dataset. It will be an important endeavor for future work to
study the dynamic interplay between wages and affective commitment in more
detail.
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2.6 Appendix to Chapter 2
Theoretical Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2:
The generalized Nash bargaining solution is obtained by maximizing the Nash
product
max
w1
((1− γ)w1 + γK (a)− c (a)− uM )λ (K (a)− w1)1−λ
with first order condition
0 = λ (1− γ) ((1− γ)w1 + γK (a)− c (a)− uM )λ−1 (K (a)− w1)1−λ
− ((1− γ)w1 + γK (a)− c (a)− uM )λ (1− λ) (K (a)− w1)−λ
⇔ w1 = λK (a) + (1− λ) uM − (γK (a)− c (a))(1− γ)
such that
∆ (γ, a) = w1
w0
=
λK (a) + (1− λ) uM−(γK(a)−c(a))(1−γ)
wM
.
When keeping efforts fixed,
∂∆ (γ, a)
∂γ
= (1− λ) −K (a) (1− γ) + (uM − (γK (a)− c (a)))
wM (1− γ)2
= (1− λ) uM − (K (a)− c (a))
wM (1− γ)2
< 0.
When efforts are endogenous, then
∂∆ (γ, a (γ))
∂γ
= λK
′ (a (γ)) a′ (γ)
wM
+
(1− λ) (−(K(a(γ))+(γK
′(a(γ))−c′(a(γ)))a′(γ)))(1−γ)+(uM−(γK(a(γ))−c(a(γ))))
(1−γ)2
wM
and using that γK ′ (a)− c′ (a) = 0 thus
∂∆ (γ, a (γ)) =
λK ′ (a (γ)) a′ (γ) + (1− λ) uM−(K(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))(1−γ)2
wM
= λ
wM
K ′ (a (γ)) a′ (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ (1− λ) uM − (K (a)− c (a))
wM (1− γ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.

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Proof of Proposition 3:
To see that the wage increase due to an external offer is increasing in γ consider
E [∆| d = 1]− E [∆| d = 0]
= (1− λ)(1− γ)
(
E [uO|uO ≤ K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))]− uM
wM
)
and note that the first derivative w.r.t. γ is
(1− λ)
(1− γ)2
(
E [uO|uO ≤ K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))]− uM
wM
)
+ (1− λ)(1− γ)wM
(
∂E [uO|uO ≤ K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))]
∂γ
)
> 0.
To determine the employee’s search efforts, consider his choice problem
max
p
p · E [∆u]− k (p)
with first order condition E [∆u] − k′ (p) = 0 such that p is strictly increasing
in E [∆u] by the implicit function theorem. Recall that is
E [∆u] =
∫ K(a(γ))−c(a(γ))
uM
(1− λ) (uO − uM ) f (uO) duO
+
∫ ∞
K(a(γ))−c(a(γ))
(uO − (1− λ)wM − λ (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))) f (uO) duO.
Now note that by Leibniz’ integral rule we have that
∂E [∆u]
∂γ
= (1− λ) (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))− uM ) f (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))) ∂(K(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))∂γ
− (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))− (1− λ)uM − λ (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))) f (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))
∂(K(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))
∂γ +
∫ ∞
K(a(γ))−c(a(γ))
(
−λ∂(K(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))∂γ f (uO)
)
duO
=
∫ ∞
K(a(γ))−c(a(γ))
(
−λ∂(K(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))∂γ f (uO)
)
duO
which is strictly negative as
∂ (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))
∂γ
= (K ′ (a (γ))− c′ (a (γ))) a′ (γ)
> (γK ′ (a (γ))− c′ (a (γ))) a′ (γ) = 0
by equation (2.1).
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Finally, the likelihood that the employee leaves the firm is
Pr (uO > K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))) = 1− F (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))
such that
∂ Pr (uO > K (a (γ))− c (a (γ)))
∂γ
= −f (K (a (γ))− c (a (γ))) ∂(K(a(γ))−c(a(γ)))∂γ < 0.

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2012/13
2014/15
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M
ean
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ge
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<
25
years
(1/0)
5920
.051
0
.22
5247
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0
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25-39
years
(1/0)
5920
.231
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.421
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.212
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.409
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years
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1
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.234
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contract
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3
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Industry:
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and
electronic
industries
(1/0)
5920
.315
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0
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Further
m
anufacturing
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.37
0
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.372
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etailand
transport
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.111
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.111
0
.315
Services
for
firm
s
(1/0)
5920
.138
0
.345
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.128
0
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Inform
ation
and
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unications
services
(1/0)
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.0667
0
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.0737
0
.261
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size:
50-99
em
ployees
(1/0)
5920
.155
0
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.115
0
.32
100-249
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0
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Investor
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0
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0
.26
Shareholders
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0
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0
.327
Public
(1/0)
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0
.13
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0
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Table
2.8:
W
age
grow
th
and
engagem
ent
D
ependent
variable
H
ourly
w
age
grow
th
4
in
%
betw
een
t
and
t+
1
(w
ins.)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Engagem
entt
(std.)
-0.093
0.099
0.166
0.870
-0.057
0.127
0.201
0.331
(0.326)
(0.325)
(0.400)
(1.448)
(0.324)
(0.323)
(0.397)
(1.471)
Sick
dayst
0.014
0.013
0.024
0.017
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.023)
(0.034)
U
npaid
overtim
et
0.091
0.158
0.199
0.018
(0.108)
(0.111)
(0.142)
(0.444)
C
onstant
7.946***
8.690***
5.615
8.643
7.652***
8.570***
5.702
8.895
(0.484)
(1.839)
(9.757)
(14.507)
(0.503)
(1.896)
(9.859)
(15.162)
O
bservations
2,977
2,947
2,947
2,947
2,949
2,920
2,920
2,920
N
um
ber
ofclusters
573
570
570
570
573
570
570
570
R
-squared
(w
ithin)
0.005
0.041
0.209
0.053
0.005
0.041
0.209
0.052
Em
ployee
&
establ.
controls
N
o
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
o
Yes
Yes
Yes
Establishm
ent
fixed
effects
N
o
N
o
Yes
Yes
N
o
N
o
Yes
Yes
Em
ployee
fixed
effects
N
o
N
o
N
o
Yes
N
o
N
o
N
o
Yes
N
otes:
R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
on
establishm
ents
in
parentheses.
C
ontrol
variables
on
em
ployee
level
include:
blue
collar,
supervisory
position,
part
tim
e,
fem
ale,
secondary
and
tertiary
education,
age,
lim
ited
w
ork
contract,
m
arital
status,
household
size,
and
year
dum
m
ies.
C
ontrol
variables
on
establishm
ent
level
include:
industry,
region,
establishm
ent
size,
ow
nership
structure,
and
independent
establishm
ent.
***
p<
0.01,**
p<
0.05,*
p<
0.1.
2.6. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 35
Table 2.9: External offer wages and commitment
Dependent variable External offer waget+1
(1) (2) (3)
Commitmentt (std.) 1,005.516*** 548.740* 523.558*
(247.084) (293.610) (309.955)
Sick dayst -10.119
(7.512)
Unpaid overtimet 28.508
(56.422)
Constant 5,713.998*** 1,409.745 1,621.968
(444.321) (941.325) (998.849)
Observations 716 701 682
Number of clusters 431 425 416
R-squared (within) 0.019 0.198 0.195
Employee & establ. controls No Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on establishments in parentheses. Control variables
on employee level include: blue collar, supervisory position, part time, female, secondary
and tertiary education, age, limited work contract, marital status, household size, and year
dummies. Control variables on establishment level include: industry, region, establishment
size, ownership structure, and independent establishment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table
2.10:
Job
search,turnover,and
com
m
itm
ent
w
ith
controlfor
personality
traits
D
ependent
variable
A
ctive
job
searcht+
1
Externaloffert+
1
Voluntary
turnovert+
1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
C
om
m
itm
entt
(std.)
-0.072***
-0.057***
-0.020***
-0.017***
-0.010***
-0.008***
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Sick
dayst
0.001
0.000
0.000
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
U
npaid
overtim
et
-0.007*
0.002*
0.001
(0.004)
(0.001)
(0.000)
Satisfaction
w
ith
payt
(std.)
-0.038***
-0.008
-0.005***
(0.015)
(0.005)
(0.002)
Extraversiont
(std.)
0.010
0.009
0.010**
0.012**
0.003**
0.003*
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.001)
C
onscientiousnesst
(std.)
-0.000
-0.002
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.002)
N
euroticism
t
(std.)
-0.010
-0.014
-0.003
-0.003
-0.000
0.000
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.001)
O
pennesst
(std.)
0.042***
0.039***
0.013***
0.012**
0.003
0.002
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.002)
A
greeablenesst
(std.)
-0.017
-0.019
-0.003
-0.002
0.003*
0.003**
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.002)
O
bservations
1,248
1,214
3,767
3,250
3,584
3,500
N
um
ber
ofclusters
475
471
617
600
597
594
Pseudo
R
-squared
0.0912
0.0984
0.108
0.109
0.190
0.208
N
otes:
R
obust
standard
errors
clustered
on
establishm
ents
in
parentheses.
A
ll
specifications
include
em
ployee
and
establishm
ent
controls.
C
ontrol
variables
on
em
ployee
level
include:
blue
collar,
supervisory
position,
part
tim
e,
fem
ale,
secondary
and
tertiary
education,
age,
lim
ited
w
ork
contract,
m
arital
status,
household
size,
and
year
dum
m
ies.
C
ontrol
variables
on
establishm
ent
level
include:
industry,
region,
establishm
ent
size,
ow
nership
structure,
and
independent
establishm
ent.
***
p<
0.01,
**
p<
0.05,
*
p<
0.1.
Chapter 3
Negative Side Effects of
Affirmative Action1
3.1 Introduction
Despite numerous endeavours to promote the career advancement of females and
ethnic minorities, these groups are still underrepresented in leading positions in
management (European Commission 2016; Beech et al. 2017; 2020 Women on
Boards 2018) and academia (American Economic Association 2018; Lundberg
and Stearns 2019). Research reveals two important channels that explain the
underrepresentation of females and ethnic minorities in leading positions: dif-
ferences in career-relevant behavior (Niederle and Versterlund 2007; Croson and
Gneezy 2009; Coffman 2014; Babcock, Recalde, et al. 2017) and discrimination
(Beaurain and Masclet 2016; Bertrand and Duflo 2017; Sarsons 2017; Mengel,
Sauermann, and Zölitz 2018). As a mean to counteract this underrepresenta-
tion, some countries and organizations implement affirmative action policies in
the form of quota regulations.2 Supporting the introduction of such interven-
tion, several studies show that quotas are effective at reducing differences in
career-relevant behavior and that quotas therefore increase the representation
of the affirmed group without harming efficiency (Balafoutas and Sutter 2012;
Niederle, Segal, and Vesterlund 2013; A. Banerjee et al. 2017).
While designed to promote an important goal, affirmative action may also entail
negative effects. In this chapter, we provide evidence for negative side effects of
quota interventions on subjective peer-reviews. Distortions in subjective perfor-
mance evaluation are considered a crucial facilitator for discrimination (Nieva
and Gutek 1980; Borgida and Fiske 2008). As peer-reviews are especially rele-
vant for career success in management and academia (Edwards and Ewen 1996;
1This chapter is joint work with Marina Schröder and based upon Petters and Schröder
(2019)
2Countries that have passed laws to implement gender quotas for management positions
include Norway, Spain, Italy, Belgium, France, and Germany. Sowell (2004) and Bagde,
Epple, and L. Taylor (2016) present examples for quotas based on ethnic background. Wallon,
Bendiscioli, and Garfinkel (2015) provide an overview for the use of quota interventions in
academia.
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Bracken 2001; L. K. Johnson 2004), distorted evaluations may have long-term
detrimental effects.3 Our results show that quotas lead to distortions in peer-
reviews of the affirmed group and therefore may actually increase discrimination
against the group that is supposed to benefit from the quota. Furthermore, the
anticipation of distortions in performance evaluation may mitigate the positive
effect of quotas on career-relevant behavior of the affirmed group (Leibbrandt
and List 2018; Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo 2018). Finally, distortions in peer-
review may affect the self-image and actual performance of affirmed individuals
in an unfavorable way (Turner and Pratkanis 1995; Heilman and Barocas Alcott
2001).
Previous research on the effect of affirmative action on performance evaluation
is mixed and has focused on evaluations provided by bystanders or superiors.
On the one hand, increased exposure to competent affirmed individuals due to
the introduction of quotas is shown to reduce biases in performance evalua-
tion (Beaman et al. 2009; Baskaran and Hessami 2018). On the other hand,
affirmative action is shown to have a negative effect on the evaluation of success-
ful affirmed individuals because success is overly ascribed to affirmative action
rather than ability (Heilman, C. Block, and J. Lucas 1992; Heilman, C. Block,
and Stathatos 1997; Bijkerk et al. 2018; M. Gürtler and O. Gürtler 2019). In a
recent closely related paper on the effect of quotas on peer-reviews in a gender
context, Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo (2018) show that women are significantly
more likely to be a victim of sabotage (intentional misreporting of objective
performance measures through peers) whenever a female quota is implemented.
While Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo (2018) provide first indications that quotas
may have an impact on peer-review behavior, we know little about the mech-
anism driving this effect or about the generalizability of this result beyond the
gender context.
Quotas can impact peer-review behavior for different reasons. First, affirmative
action interventions substantially change the competitive structure of a tour-
nament (Schotter and Weigelt 1992; Holzer and Neumark 2000; Franke 2012;
Calsamiglia, Franke, and Rey-Biel 2013; Chowdhury and O. Gürtler 2015). En-
hanced competition among affirmed individuals due to a quota is likely to lead
to distortions in peer-reviews as affirmed individuals have an incentive to pro-
vide less favorable peer-reviews to affirmed peers.4 Second, quotas increase the
winning probabilities of affirmed individuals at the cost of non-affirmed peers.
Inequity-averse individuals (affirmed and non-affirmed) may react to a quota by
providing distorted peer-reviews favoring non-affirmed individuals to counteract
procedural unfairness (Konow 1996; Cappelen et al. 2007).
In our experiment, we randomly assign individuals to affirmed or non-affirmed
types.5 Within groups of four, participants compete for two prizes each by per-
3In management, peer-reviewing is widespread. The majority of companies listed in the
Fortune 500 use peer-reviews as a tool for subjective performance evaluation of management
positions (Edwards and Ewen 1996; Bracken 2001). In academia, peer-reviews are relevant
for placement and tenure decisions, publication success, and research funding.
4Subjective peer-reviews are prone to - conscious or unconscious - biases. In settings
without a quota, peer-reviews are shown to be sensitive to changes in the incentive structure
(Carpenter, Matthews, and Schirm 2010; Rosaz and Villeval 2012; Balietti, Goldstone, and
Helbing 2016). Harbring et al. (2007) show that sabotage behavior in a contest is affected by
the symmetry of the tournament.
5Random assignment of a quota is an important difference between our experimental study
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forming a creative real-effort task (Laske and Schröder 2016).6 Prizes in the
tournament are awarded according to subjective peer-reviews and - depending
on the treatment - a quota. In treatments without a quota, the two prizes are
rewarded to the two (out of four) participants with the highest score in the
peer-review. In treatments with a quota, at least one of the two prizes has to
be awarded to one of the two randomly determined affirmed type participants.
As previous research reveals that the effect of affirmative action depends on
its perceived justification (Harrison et al. 2006; Balafoutas, Davis, and Sutter
2016; Ip, Leibbrandt, and Vecci 2018), we conduct our experiment in two differ-
ent settings. In the ex-ante equal setting, affirmed and non-affirmed individuals
face the same procedure for working on the task. In the ex-ante unequal set-
ting, affirmed individuals face procedural disadvantages that provide a possible
justification for the introduction of a quota.
We find evidence for substantial biases in peer-reviews due to the introduction of
a quota. First, quotas have an impact on the average level of peer-reviews pro-
vided. The observed level effects vary depending on the setting (ex-ante equal
or ex-ante unequal) and thus seem to be related to the perceived procedural fair-
ness of the quota. Second, quotas lead to substantial distortions in peer-reviews,
such that under a quota, affirmed individuals receive significantly less favorable
peer-reviews compared to non-affirmed peers with similar performance accord-
ing to an independent measure. Importantly, we show that these distortions in
peer-reviews are unrelated to procedural inequalities and are driven by reviews
provided by affirmed individuals. Thus, it seems that distortions in peer-reviews
are the result of enhanced competition among affirmed individuals due to the
introduction of a quota. In a subsequent dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994),
we find that facing a quota in the previous tournament experiment significantly
reduces subsequent altruistic behavior among affirmed individuals. Thus, we
provide evidence for behavioral spillovers of quotas beyond the context in which
they are implemented.
3.2 Experimental Design
In our experiment, participants face a tournament setting in which groups of
four participants compete for two prizes. At the beginning of the experiment,
we randomly assign participants to one of two types (yellow or green). Each
group consists of two yellow and two green type participants. Each round of
the tournament consists of two stages: a working stage and a peer-review stage.
In the working stage, participants perform a creative real-effort task. The task
and most previous experimental studies on the effect of quotas (see e.g. Niederle, Segal, and
Vesterlund 2013; Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo 2018). Randomly assigning the quota provides
an advantage by allowing us to cleanly induce unequal opportunities and thus study the effect
of justification of a quota. Furthermore, due to the random assignment of a quota, we can
rule out that our findings are specific to certain groups, i.e., females or non-whites. Thus, our
findings can also be applied to other types of quotas, i.e., quotas based on race or caste.
6The use of a creative task has two important advantages. First, the use of subjective
performance evaluations is very natural in this context because by definition creative perfor-
mance cannot be quantified through objective measures. Second, creative work is especially
relevant in leading positions in management and in academia. Thus, creative work is highly
relevant for the type of work in which quotas are often implemented.
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consists of illustrating predefined objects using a given set of materials. It
is a modified version of the task introduced by Laske and Schröder (2016).
Participants receive a set of materials: one string, two O-rings, four wooden
sticks, and twelve colored glass pebbles (see figure 3.1) and are asked to use
these materials to illustrate specific objects, i.e., eyeglasses, a flower, and a
car. Participants are instructed to take pictures of their illustrations using
a special software and a pre-installed webcam. See figure 3.2 for examples of
pictures of the illustrations and the appendix to this chapter for the experimental
instructions. The time available in the working stage is restricted and depends
on the treatment and the type of the participant (see figure 3.3 for an overview
of our treatments). Within the limited time frame, participants can take as
many pictures as they want. Once the time is up, participants choose one of
these pictures to be payoff-relevant. All other pictures are deleted and not
payoff-relevant.
Figure 3.1: Set of materials
In the peer-review stage of each tournament round, participants see the pic-
tures of the illustrations created by their group members (including their own
illustration) and are asked to rate the illustrations of their peers (participants
did not rate their own illustrations) on a scale from 0.0 to 10.0 (0.0 being the
worst rating and 10.0 being the best rating). Thus, in the peer-review stage,
the illustrations of all participants are evaluated by the three other participants
of each group. Prizes are awarded according to the mean rating from this peer-
review and, if applicable, a quota. We conduct three rounds of the tournament
without feedback and with random rematching within matching groups of eight
participants between rounds.
Between treatments, we vary whether or not a quota is implemented. In treat-
ments without a quota, the two participants with the highest and the second
highest peer-review receive a prize independent of their type. In treatments
with a quota, at least one of the two prizes is awarded to a participant of the
affirmed type. Thus, in treatments involving a quota, the participant among
the affirmed types with the highest mean rating from the peer-review receives a
prize for sure (even if this participant is not among the two participants with the
highest mean ratings) and the participant among the remaining three partici-
pants of either type with the highest mean rating from the peer-review receives
a prize.
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We consider two different settings in which quotas are implemented. In the ex-
ante equal setting, all participants face the same procedure absent of a quota,
which means that all types have five minutes to work on the task in each round.
In the ex-ante unequal setting, one type faces procedural disadvantages by hav-
ing a reduced working time of only 2 minutes and 30 seconds.
Figure 3.2: Examples of illustrations
When a quota is implemented in this setting, the type with the shorter working
time is also affirmed. Figure 3.3 summarizes the treatments of our experiment.
In the Baseline_equal treatment all participants face the same procedure and no
quota is implemented. In theQuota_equal treatment, we implement a quota in a
setting where all participants face the same procedure. In the Baseline_unequal
treatment, one type faces reduced working time, but no quota is implemented.
In the Quota_unequal treatment7, the type that faces reduced working time is
also affirmed by a quota.
The quota is implemented according to the randomly assigned type (yellow or
green) and thus independent of any characteristics of the participants. In all
treatments, we randomized whether green or yellow individuals are affirmed
and/or face procedural disadvantages. In the peer-review stage, the pictures
are shown in a randomized order. They have a colored frame, which indicates
the type of the ratee (see frames in example pictures provided in figure 3.2).
Thus, the types - but not the identity - of the other participants are common
information.
Participants are only paid for one randomly determined round of the main
experiment. The two winners of the tournament in this round receive a prize of
16 euros each while the other participants receive zero for their performance in
the task. In addition to payment for performance in the task, all participants
receive a show-up fee of 4 euros and can earn up to 2 euros in the subsequent
dictator experiment. At the end of each experimental session, we distributed
a pen and paper questionnaire (see the appendix to this chapter for the full
questionnaire), in which we ask about demographics as well as perceived fairness
of the experimental procedure, which participants should rate on a scale from
1 (very unfair) to 5 (very fair). We conducted the experiments in April and
October 2016 and May 2017 at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
7One group had to be eliminated from the analysis of this treatment because one subject
from this group did not pass the control questions.
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(CLER). Overall, 632 subjects participated in our experiment and we ran 40
experimental sessions. We used Java to program our experiments and recruited
the participants through the online recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2015).
Figure 3.3: Treatments
Our treatment interventions can have an effect on peer-review behavior, but it
can also affect performance per se. To be able to distinguish between these two
effects, we elicit a performance measure that is independent of our treatment
interventions. We conduct an online experiment, in which we ask a total of
400 independent raters to evaluate the illustrations from the experiment on the
same scale as in the laboratory experiment (0.0 to 10.0). To avoid overload of
the raters, each rater evaluates a subset of 64 pictures. In the online experiment,
each screen shown to the raters displays four pictures from one group in one
round. The composition of pictures on one screen shown to the independent
raters was identical to that shown to the participants of the experiment. The
pictures also have the yellow and green frames as in the laboratory experiment.
One important difference to the main experiment is that the evaluators are blind
to the treatment and do not know what the frames mean. Each set of pictures
is evaluated by ten different raters. The average of these ten evaluations consti-
tutes our independent quality measure. Participants in the online experiment
receive a fixed payment of 2 euros and can earn an additional bonus of up to
4 euros, which is awarded according to the quadratic deviation from the mean
evaluation for one randomly chosen picture (we follow the procedure suggested
by Selten 1998). We programmed this experiment using the online survey tool
SoSci Survey (Leiner 2014). Online raters were also recruited through the online
recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2015) using the same subject pool as in
the main experiment but ensuring that evaluators did not participate in any
previous related experiments.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Biases in Peer-reviews
Across all treatments, the average peer-review is 2.59 points, while the average
score on the independent evaluation is equal to 6.00 (see table 3.4 in the ap-
pendix to this chapter for summary statistics). For all treatments and types,
we find that peer-reviews are significantly less favorable as compared to the in-
dependent ratings (pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01 for all types and
treatments), but significantly larger than zero (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01
for all types and treatments).8 Thus, we find evidence for a substantial differ-
ence between the independent measure and the peer-review.9
To analyze biases in peer-reviews that are due to the introduction of a quota,
we provide regression analysis results in table 3.1. In specifications (1) and
(2), we focus on the ex-ante equal setting and in specifications (3) and (4), we
focus on the ex-ante unequal setting.10 In specification (1) we only include a
quota dummy and a dummy for affirmed ratees (receiver of an evaluation). The
coefficient of the quota dummy is informative of the effect of a quota on the
overall level of peer-reviews. The coefficient of the affirmed ratee dummy is
informative of distortions in peer-reviews, i.e., systematic differences of peer-
reviews provided depending on the type of the ratee.
In the ex-ante equal setting, we find a slight but insignificant negative level
effect. Additionally, we find a significant and negative coefficient of the af-
firmed ratee dummy. Affirmed ratees receive around 0.6 points less favorable
evaluations, which amounts to 21% of the average evaluation in the baseline.
This provides evidence for a significant distortion effect, where affirmed types
receive less favorable peer-reviews compared to non-affirmed peers. To better
understand the extent to which this distortion is due to changes in the perfor-
mance of affirmed types, we include the independent performance measure as
an additional control in specification (2).11 Introducing this control reduces the
distortion effect slightly, but the coefficient for affirmed ratees is still large and
statistically significant.
In the ex-ante unequal setting (specifications (3) and (4)), we find that the
introduction of a quota has a positive and significant effect on the overall level
8For the non-parametric analysis in this chapter, we use mean values for the matching
groups of eight participants and over all rounds of the experiment. We always report p-values
for two-sided tests.
9In order to address the concern that our independent online raters have no experience
with the task that they evaluate, we asked a subset of our participants in the laboratory
experiment to rate illustrations created in different sessions after they have completed the
main experiment. We only elicited this measure for the ex-ante equal setting. In this setting,
however, we can show that the main results presented in this chapter are robust to using this
alternative performance measure as a control variable. Analysis using experienced lab raters
can be found in table 3.5 in the appendix to this chapter.
10In table 3.6 in the appendix to this chapter, we provide an additional specification which
analyzes both settings in one model.
11In table 3.7 in the appendix to this chapter, we provide an analysis of the effect of our
treatment interventions on performance. We do not find evidence for a significant effect of
quotas on the performance as measured through independent ratings. However, we do find
that procedural disadvantages induced by reduced working time are in fact relevant and have
a negative effect on performance.
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of peer-reviews provided. That is, we find that overall peer-reviews provided are
about 0.6 points more favorable and thus, closer to the independent rating, when
a quota is implemented. As in the ex-ante equal setting, we find evidence for
a significant distortion effect, where affirmed types receive less favorable peer-
reviews compared to non-affirmed peers. Affirmed ratees receive evaluations
that are around 0.6 points less favorable compared to non-affirmed ratees. This
distortion amounts to around 25% less favorable evaluations compared to the
corresponding reference group in the baseline. Interestingly, we do not find a
significant effect of being disadvantaged on the peer-reviews received. In column
(4), we additionally control for performance. If anything, including this control
explains a very small part of the distortion in peer-reviews, since the coefficient
of affirmed remains large and highly significant. Again, we find no significant
difference in peer-reviews provided to disadvantaged types compared to non-
disadvantaged peers.
Table 3.1: Regression analysis peer-reviews provided
Dependent variable: Ex-ante equal Ex-ante unequal
Peer-review (1) (2) (3) (4)
Quota -0.130 -0.036 0.634** 0.645**
(0.217) (0.240) (0.283) (0.300)
Affirmed ratee -0.562*** -0.502*** -0.632*** -0.544***
(0.153) (0.143) (0.229) (0.199)
Disadvantaged ratee -0.011 0.178
(0.135) (0.118)
Independent rating 0.341*** 0.382***
(0.026) (0.026)
Constant 2.884*** 0.734*** 2.383*** 0.012
(0.157) (0.214) (0.221) (0.247)
Observations 2,880 2,880 2,808 2,808
Number of participants 320 320 312 312
Number of groups 40 40 39 39
Notes: Two-way error component linear model, allowing for creator and evaluator random effects.
The dependent variable is peer-review received. Independent variables: Quota (dummy equal to
one in treatments with a quota), Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed ratees in the
treatments with a quota), Disadvantaged ratee (dummy equal to one for disadvantaged ratees in
all treatments involving less working time for disadvantaged type), Independent Rating
(continuousvariable with the mean evaluation of independent raters who are blind to treatments).
In all specifications robust standard errors are clustered by matching groups of eight participants.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To understand the source of these biases in peer-reviews, we analyze the behavior
of affirmed and non-affirmed raters (sender of an evaluation) separately. Table
3.2 provides results using the same regression procedure as in specifications (2)
and (4) of table 3.1, but splits the sample depending on the type of the rater.
In the ex-ante equal setting, we use all observations from the baseline as a
reference group for both the affirmed and the non-affirmed types. Specification
(1) in table 3.2 presents the results for affirmed raters in the ex-ante equal
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setting. While we find no effect of quotas on the overall level of peer-reviews
provided by affirmed raters, we find evidence for a strong distortion effect where
affirmed raters provide significantly less favorable peer-reviews to affirmed peers,
i.e., around 0.6 points less favorable evaluations. Specification (2) presents the
results for non-affirmed raters in the ex-ante equal setting. We find evidence for
a significant level effect, i.e., non-affirmed raters provide around 0.8 points less
favorable peer-reviews overall whenever quotas are implemented. However, we
do not find evidence for a significant distortion effect on evaluations provided
by non-affirmed raters.
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Table 3.2: Regression analysis peer-reviews provided by rater type
Dependent variable: Ex-ante equal Ex-ante unequal
Peer-review (1)
Affirmed
rater
(2)
Non-
affirmed
rater
(3)
Affirmed
rater
(4)
Non-
affirmed
rater
Quota 0.217 -0.806*** 1.028*** -0.094
(0.306) (0.282) (0.344) (0.407)
Affirmed ratee -0.595*** 0.137 -0.701*** 0.111
(0.190) (0.088) (0.198) (0.178)
Disadvantaged ratee 0.003 0.072
(0.118) (0.145)
Independent rating 0.346*** 0.339*** 0.347*** 0.400***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.044) (0.036)
Constant 0.690*** 0.747*** 0.101 0.179
(0.236) (0.210) (0.333) (0.300)
Observations 2,160 2,160 1,404 1,404
Number of participants 320 320 312 312
Number of groups 40 40 39 39
Notes: Two-way error component linear model, allowing for creator and evaluator random effects.
Separate models for affirmed and non-affirmed raters.
The dependent variable is peer-review received. Independent variables: Quota (dummy equal to
one in treatments with a quota), Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed ratees in the
treatments with a quota), Disadvantaged ratee (dummy equal to one for disadvantaged ratees in
all treatments involving less working time for disadvantaged type), Independent Rating
(continuousvariable with the mean evaluation of independent raters who are blind to treatments).
In the ex-ante equal setting, all raters from the Baseline_equal serve as a reference group for
both affirmed and non-affirmed raters. In the ex-ante unequal, disadvantaged raters from the
Baseline_unequal treatment serve as the reference group for affirmed raters, while the
non-disadvantaged individuals from the Baseline_unequal treatment serve as reference
group for non-affirmed raters in the Quota_unequal treatment.
In all specifications robust standard errors are clustered by matching groups of eight participants.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Specifications (3) and (4) provide the results for the ex-ante unequal setting. In
specification (3), we focus on affirmed raters. With respect to the level effect, we
find that affirmed raters provide significantly more favorable peer-reviews, i.e.,
around 1.0 point more favorable evaluations compared to the baseline, when-
ever a quota is implemented. We also find evidence for a large and significant
distortion effect, where affirmed raters provide of around 0.7 points less favor-
able peer-reviews to other affirmed peers as compared to non-affirmed peers. As
presented in specification (4), we do not find evidence for any systematic biases
in peer-reviews provided by non-affirmed raters when a quota is introduced in
the ex-ante unequal setting.
Thus, it seems that level effects depend on the setting in which a quota is
implemented, while distortion effects are fully driven by reviews provided by
affirmed raters and seem to be independent of the setting. As a robustness
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check for this interpretation, we provide the results from regression analyses in
which we additionally control for perceived procedural fairness in table 3.8 in
the appendix to this chapter. We find that adding this control substantially
reduces observed level effects but has basically no effect on observed distortion
effects.12
3.3.2 Tokenization of Affirmed Winners
In figure 3.4, we display the fraction of tournament winners from the affirmed
group by treatments. We additionally differentiate between “merit winners”
– winners of the affirmed type who are among the two participants with the
highest peer-review – and “token winners” – affirmed winners who are not
among the two performers with the highest peer-review, but win because of
the quota intervention. We find that in both the ex-ante equal and the ex-
ante unequal settings, the introduction of the quota significantly increases the
overall number of tournament winners from the affirmed type (Mann-Whitney
U-test, p<0.01 and p=0.08, correspondingly). In both the Baseline_equal and
the Baseline_unequal treatments, by design, all winners are “merit winners”. In
the Quota_equal and the Quota_unequal treatments, in absence of side-effects
of quotas, the fraction of “merit winners” would be unaffected by the intro-
duction of a quota and the fraction of “token winners” would correspond to
the increase in the representation of affirmed types among tournament winners.
However, in our experiment we observe substantial distortions in peer-reviews.
Thus, we find that quotas lead to a decrease in the fraction of affirmed “merit
winners” (Whitney U-test, p≤0.01 for both settings). As a consequence, the
fraction of “token winners” is larger than the actual increase in the represen-
tation of affirmed types among tournament winners. Therefore affirmed types
appear to be in the need of a quota to win the tournament, whereas a large frac-
tion of these “token winners” would also have been among the winners without
a quota intervention.
12In table 3.9 in the appendix to this chapter, we provide further analysis splitting the
sample into male and female raters. We find that distortion effects are independent of gender.
With respect to level effects, we observe some gender differences, where affirmed females raters
provide more favorable peer-reviews when a quota is implemented.
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Notes: In the ex-ante equal setting, one random type from the Baseline_equal serves as
reference group for affirmed types in the Quota_equal treatment. In the ex-ante unequal
setting, disadvantaged types from the Baseline_unequal treatment serve as reference
group for affirmed and disadvantaged types in the Quota_unequal treatment.
Figure 3.4: Fraction of affirmed winners
3.3.3 Spillover Effects of Quotas
Lastly, we are interested in spillover effects of quotas on behavior in a dictator
game that does not involve any quota regulation. Therefore, we conduct a dic-
tator experiment (Forsythe et al. 1994) after the main experiment. Besides the
fact that we inform dictators about the receiver’s type from the previous exper-
iment, this experiment is unrelated to the main experiment. The instructions
for this experiment are given after completion of the main experiment (see the
appendix to this chapter for the experimental instructions). In this experiment,
dictators allocate 2 euros between themselves and an anonymous recipient. Dic-
tators are informed about the type of the recipient (yellow or green) from the
previous tournament experiment. We repeat the dictator game four times with
random rematching, so that each participant acts twice as a dictator and twice
as a recipient. In both roles (dictator and recipient), each participant is matched
to both a yellow and a green type player. We randomized the sequence of the
four rounds. Only one of the rounds is randomly chosen for payment, and no
feedback is given between the rounds.
In table 3.3, we show the results from a linear regression analysis with the
amount sent in the dictator game as the dependent variable and a quota dummy
and dummies for affirmed and if applicable, disadvantaged receiver as inde-
pendent variables. Specification (1) and (2) show the results for the ex-ante
equal setting, and specification (3) and (4) for the ex-ante unequal setting. For
each setting, we analyze dictator behavior for the previously affirmed and non-
affirmed group separately.
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Table 3.3: Regression analysis dictator game
Dependent variable: Ex-ante equal Ex-ante unequal
Peer-review (1)
Affirmed
dictator
(2)
Non-
affirmed
dictator
(3)
Affirmed
dictator
(4)
Non-
affirmed
dictator
Quota 0.081 -0.029 0.078 0.010
(0.060) (0.055) (0.058) (0.064)
Affirmed receiver -0.067** -0.106*** -0.064* -0.017
(0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.037)
Disadvantaged receiver 0.088*** -0.004
(0.026) (0.022)
Constant 0.324*** 0.324*** 0.211*** 0.295***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.045)
Observations 480 480 312 312
Number of participants 240 240 156 156
Number of groups 40 40 39 39
Notes: Ordinary-least squares linear model. Separate models for affirmed and non-affirmed raters.
The dependent variable is the amount sent in the dictator game.
Independent variables: Quota (dummy equal to one in treatments with a quota), Affirmed receiver
(dummy equal to one if receiver was affirmed in the previous experiment), Disadvantaged receiver
(dummy equal to one if receiver was disadvantaged in the previous experiment).
In the ex-ante equal setting, all dictators from the Baseline_equal serve as a reference group for
both affirmed and non-affirmed dictators. In the ex-ante unequal, the dictatators that were
disadvantaged in the previous Baseline_unequal treatment serve as the reference group for
affirmed dictators, while the dictators that were non-disadvantaged in the previous experiment
serve as reference group for non-affirmed dictators in the Quota_unequal treatment.
In all specifications robust standard errors are clustered by matching groups of eight participants.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Throughout all specifications, we do not find any significant effect of facing
a quota in the previous experiment on the overall level of giving. However,
we do observe distortion effects where participants, who were affirmed in the
previous experiment, receive significantly lower contributions in the subsequent
dictator game. Independent of the setting, we find that a quota in the previous
experiment leads to lower giving by dictators, who were previously affirmed,
to previously affirmed receivers of around 0.07 and 0.06 euros respectively. In
both treatments, this amounts to 22% less compared to the average in the
corresponding baseline. For dictators who were non-affirmed in the previous
experiment, we find that distortions in dictator giving depend on the setting of
the previous experiment. Dictators who faced the ex-ante equal setting in the
previous experiment, give around 0.11 euros less to receivers who were affirmed
in the previous experiment as compared to receivers who were non-affirmed,
i.e., around 34% less compared to the Baseline_equal treatment. Dictators who
faced the ex-ante unequal setting in the previous experiment, do not discriminate
based on the type of the receiver in the previous experiment.
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide evidence for biases in subjective performance evalua-
tions which arise due to the introduction of a quota. We find that quotas have a
significant effect on the overall level of peer-reviews provided and that this effect
varies with the setting in which quotas are implemented. In our experimental
study, the average level of peer-review does not have an impact on tournament
outcomes. Thus, level effects do not counteract procedural inequalities arising
due to the implementation of a quota. Nevertheless, we observe that the ef-
fect of a quota on the level of peer-reviews provided is sensitive to the setting
in which quotas are implemented. We can show that this difference is mainly
driven by differences in perceived procedural fairness due to the introduction
of a quota. One explanation for this finding is that costs of providing biased
reviews depend on perceived procedural fairness. This interpretation is in line
with previous findings on the effect of perceived fairness on unethical behavior
(see e.g., Greenberg 1990; Schweitzer and Gibson 2008; Houser, Vetter, and
Winter 2012). In real-life work situations, such level effects may have additional
motivational implications (Heilman and Barocas Alcott 2001; Unzueta, Gutiér-
rez, and Ghavami 2010) and may be problematic whenever peer-reviews elicited
under a quota regime are compared to reviews elicited absent of a quota regime.
We additionally show that quotas lead to systematic distortions in peer-reviews,
where affirmed individuals receive less favorable peer-reviews as compared to
non-affirmed individuals whenever quotas are implemented. These distortions
seem to be unrelated to ex-ante procedural fairness. Given that distortions are
fully driven by peer-reviews provided by affirmed types, it seems that distor-
tions are the consequence of enhanced competition among affirmed individuals
whenever quotas are implemented. While a quota compensates for the potential
distortions in prize assignment due to biased peer-reviews, quotas may have a
long-term negative impact on the career chances of affirmed individuals. Distor-
tions make affirmed types appear to be less able and in the need of a quota even
when they are not. As peer-reviews are widely used in domains where objective
performance measures are lacking, such distortions can have far-reaching conse-
quences on career-relevant opportunities of affirmed individuals. In practice, the
same performance evaluations are often used for multiple managerial decisions
(Edwards and Ewen 1996; Bracken 2001; L. K. Johnson 2004). Distortions in
performance evaluations arising due to a quota may therefore negatively affect
the career opportunities of affirmed individuals in contexts which go beyond the
scope of the quota regulation. Additionally, distorted peer-reviews may serve
as an anchor for future performance evaluations (Tversky and Kahneman 1974;
Thorsteinson et al. 2008). Furthermore, performance evaluations affect self-
image and motivation (Unzueta, Gutiérrez, and Ghavami 2010; Heilman and
Barocas Alcott 2001; Leslie, Mayer, and Kravitz 2014). Relatively unfavorable
peer-reviews may therefore reduce the future productivity of affirmed individu-
als and may discourage them from pursuing relevant career paths (Leibbrandt
and List 2018; Leibbrandt, Wang, and Foo 2018).
In addition, we study spillover effects of quotas on altruistic behavior in a non-
competitive context that is not regulated by a quota. In line with previous re-
search on spillover effects of quotas (Kölle 2017; Maggian and Montinari 2017;
R. Banerjee, Gupta, and Villeval 2018), we do not find evidence of an effect of
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quotas on the overall level of altruistic behavior. However, the implementation
of a quota in the previous experiment substantially reduces altruistic behavior
among individuals who were affirmed in the previous experiment. Proponents
of affirmative action argue that by increasing the representation of a minority
group, this also fosters cooperative networks amongst them and thus acts as
a catalyzer. Our findings, however, suggest that quota interventions may un-
dermine the effectiveness with respect to the establishment of social networks
(Athey, Avery, and Zemsky 2000; Bertrand, S. Black, et al. 2019; Buckles 2019).
Overall, our research provides an important contribution to better understand
the mechanisms behind a quota intervention. While quotas are a popular form
of affirmative action and have been rolled out in many countries, most of the
literature has focused on the positive effects of quota interventions with respect
to tournament entry and gender. Our project enriches the discussion of quota
interventions by exploring distortions in subjective peer-reviews as an important
channel that could mitigate the positive effects of quotas.
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3
Experimental Instructions - Main Experiment
Welcome to this experiment! 
Please carefully read through the following instructions. If you have a question, please raise 
your hand. We will then come to your desk and answer your question. 
All of your decisions are anonymous. Communication with other participants is not permitted 
for the duration of the experiment. We would like to ask you to switch off your mobile phone 
and place it in your bag.  
You will receive a show-up fee of 4 euros for your participation. You can earn additional money 
in the following experiment. 
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Instructions 
 
Experimental Procedure 
 This experiment consists of multiple rounds. 
o Initially, you will take part in a test round that is not relevant for your payment. 
o After that, 3 experimental rounds will be conducted. 
 At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned a type. 
o You are either type “green” or type “yellow”. 
o You can recognize your type based on the color of the frame of your display. 
o This type assignment remains constant for the entire experiment. 
 In each round, you will be randomly assigned to a group of four participants. 
o Each group consists of 2 type “green” and 2 type “yellow” participants. 
o You will be assigned to a new group in each round. 
o However, your type (green or yellow) remains constant for the entire experiment. 
Your Task 
 Your task is to illustrate an object using given materials. 
o Group members of both types are provided with the same materials to illustrate the 
object (see images below) 
 The materials provided to type “yellow” members are pictured in the bottom 
left (yellow frame). 
 The materials provided to type “green” members are pictured in the bottom 
right (green frame). 
o The object that you are supposed to illustrate will be displayed on your screen. 
o You will illustrate a different object in each round. 
o All members of your group have to illustrate the same object in the respective 
rounds. 
Baseline_equal and Quota_equal Treatments: 
o You have 5 minutes time available in each round. 
Baseline_unequal and Quota_unequal Treatments: 
o The time available to illustrate the object in each round is limited 
 Type “yellow” (”green”) group members have 2 minutes and 30 seconds 
available in each round. 
 Type “green” (”yellow”) group members have 5 minutes available in each 
round. 
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Rating the Illustrations 
 Each group member rates the other 3 group members’ illustrations 
 The color of the frame of the respective illustrations indicates the type (green or yellow) to 
which the group member who produced the illustration belongs.  
 The rating is conducted on a scale from 0.0 to 10.0 points. 
o 0.0 points correspond to the worst rating. 
o 10.0 points correspond to the best rating. 
o Please always specify exactly one decimal place (please use a dot as a decimal 
sign). 
 The sum of the points awarded equals the final rating. 
o For each illustration, this final rating lies between 0.0 and 30.0 points.  
Payment 
 At the end of the experiment, one of the three experimental rounds will be randomly 
chosen. 
o Only this round is relevant for the payment. 
 Based on the final rating and the assigned type, exactly two prizes with the amount of 16 
euros each will be paid out to two different group members. 
 
Baseline_equal and Baseline_unequal Treatments: 
 
o The group member with the highest final rating among all group members of both 
types receives a prize. 
o The group member with the highest final rating among the remaining three group 
members of both types receives a prize. 
o The other two group members do not receive a prize. 
o This means that at most two prizes are awarded to type “green” group members. 
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o This means that at most two prizes are awarded to type “yellow” group 
members. 
 
 
Quota_equal and Quota_unequal Treatments: 
 
o The type “green” (”yellow”) group member with the higher final rating between 
the two type “green” (“yellow”) group members receives a prize. 
o The group member with the highest final rating among the remaining three group 
members of both types receives a prize. 
o The other two group members do not receive a prize. 
o This means that at least one prize and at most two prizes are awarded to type 
“green” (”yellow”) group members. 
o This means that at most one prize are awarded to the type “yellow” (”green”) 
group members.  
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Procedure 
 
Please proceed with the illustration of the object as follows: 
 
1. Illustrate the object in the marked area using the provided materials. 
 
 
 
2. Take a photo of the illustrated object by clicking on “take photo.” If the photo meets 
your expectations, save this photo by clicking on “save photo.” If a photo does not meet 
your expectations, you can delete it by clicking on “delete photo.”  
3. You can take and save as many photos as you wish during the time available. You 
cannot take or save any additional photos after time has expired. 
4. After time has expired, you have the opportunity to choose one of your saved photos. 
Only this photo will be rated by the other group members in the next step. None of the 
other photos will be rated. 
5. Note that only previously saved photos can be chosen. 
 
Please note the following when illustrating the objects: 
 
 Only use the provided materials. 
 For each illustration, you may use all materials or a selection of materials. 
 Place the object only within the area marked with the piece of paper (only this area will 
be captured by the camera) 
 Pay attention to the direction of your illustration (the piece of paper is labeled with “top” 
and “bottom”). 
 Pay attention that your hands are not visible in the marked area. 
 Keep the unused materials outside of the marked area. 
 Please do not write or draw on the piece of paper representing the marked area. 
 Pay attention to the time limit for the task; after time has expired you cannot take or 
save any new photos.  
 
  
1. 
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Post-experimental Questionnaire
  
 
Questionnaire 
 
Please, answer the following questions while we prepare the payment.  
Thank you! 
1. Please, indicate your gender:  
female male 
□ □ 
2. How old are you?  
3. How many siblings do you have?  
4. Do you have a red-green colorblindness? 
Yes No 
□ □ 
 
Please answer the following questions using the provided scale. 
 
5. How satisfied are you with the experiment overall? 
Not satisfied at all    Very satisfied 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. How much would you like to participate in an experiment like this one again? 
Not at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
7. How likely is it that you would recommend participating in an experiment like this one to a 
friend? 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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8. How fair did you consider the payment procedure of this experiment? 
Not fair at all    Very fair 
□ □ □ □ □ 
9. Did you feel disadvantaged or advantaged by the payment procedure of this experiment?  
Very 
disadvantaged 
   Very advantaged 
□ □ □ □ □ 
10. How justified did you consider this disadvantage or advantage? 
Not justified at all    Very justified 
□ □ □ □ □ 
11. How much fun did you have solving the task? 
No fun at all    A lot of fun 
□ □ □ □ □ 
12. How creative are you? 
Not creative at all    Very creative 
□ □ □ □ □ 
13. How difficult did you find the task?  
Not difficult at all    Very difficult 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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14. How well, do you think, you performed compared to the other participants in this room? 
Far below 
average 
   
Far above 
average 
□ □ □ □ □ 
15. In how many rounds do you think you received the highest or second highest final rating?  
0 1 2 3 
□ □ □ □ 
16. In how many of these three rounds do you think you received a prize? 
0 1 2 3 
□ □ □ □ 
17. How likely is it, do you think, that the other group members rated your illustration according 
to its quality? 
Not likely at all    Very likely 
□ □ □ □ □ 
18. How do you see yourself: Are you someone who is willing to take risks or do you try to avoid 
them? 
 
Not willing at all 
to take risks 
   
Very willing to 
take risks 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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Please indicate for the following questions how much the respective statements apply to you. 
19. I get upset when someone is better off for no reason. 
Doesn’t apply at 
all 
   Fully applies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
20. I feel guilty when I am better off for no reason. 
Doesn’t apply at 
all 
   Fully applies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
21. If someone harms me on purpose, I will try to take revenge even when I have to bear the 
costs.  
Doesn’t apply at 
all 
   Fully applies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
22. If someone does me a favor, I am happy to return it. 
Doesn’t apply at 
all 
   Fully applies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
23.  I like to compete with others. 
Doesn’t apply at 
all 
   Fully applies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
24.  It is important to me to be the best. 
Doesn’t apply at 
all 
   Fully applies 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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Additional Regressions
Table 3.5: Regression analysis peer-reviews provided by rater type with lab
raters as control for independent ratings
Dependent variable: Ex-ante equal
Peer-review (1)
All
(2)
Affirmed rater
(3)
Non-affirmed
rater
Quota -0.210 0.036 -0.876***
(0.224) (0.278) (0.313)
Affirmed ratee -0.565*** -0.659*** 0.075
(0.145) (0.194) (0.085)
Independent rating 0.427*** 0.470*** 0.421***
(0.044) (0.053) (0.048)
Constant 0.940*** 0.749*** 0.968***
(0.232) (0.262) (0.241)
Observations 2,880 2,160 2,160
Number of participants 320 320 320
Number of groups 40 40 40
Notes: Two-way error component linear model, allowing for creator and evaluator
random effects. Separate models for affirmed and non-affirmed raters. The dependent
variable is peer-review received. Independent variables: Quota (dummy equal to
one in treatments with a quota), Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed
ratees in the treatments with a quota), Independent Rating (lab rater) (continuous
variable with the mean evaluation of independent raters who are blind to treatments).
All individuals from the Baseline_equal serve as a reference group for both affirmed
and non-affirmed raters. In all specifications robust standard errors are clustered by
matching groups of eight participants.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: Regression analysis peer-reviews provided – all treatments combined
Dependent variable: Peer-review (1)
All
(2)
Affirmed rater
(3)
Non-affirmed
rater
Quota_equal -0.012 0.389 -0.801***
(0.241) (0.299) (0.281)
Quota_equal x affirmed ratee -0.498*** -0.595*** 0.142
(0.142) (0.188) (0.089)
Unequal -0.470 -0.602* -0.193
(0.296) (0.314) (0.319)
Unequal x disadvantaged ratee 0.169 0.003 0.055
(0.117) (0.116) (0.142)
Quota_unequal 0.650** 1.028*** -0.099
(0.296) (0.342) (0.402)
Quota_unequal x affirmed ratee -0.549*** -0.701*** 0.103
(0.198) (0.196) (0.177)
Independent rating 0.362*** 0.347*** 0.365***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.022)
Constant 0.603*** 0.700*** 0.580***
(0.195) (0.218) (0.200)
Observations 5,688 3,564 3,564
Number of participants 632 316 316
Number of groups 79 79 79
Notes: Two-way error component linear model, allowing for creator and evaluator random effects.
Models including all settings and treatments and either all or only affirmed or non-affirmed raters.
The dependent variable is peer-review received. Independent variables:
Quota_equal (dummy equal to one in Quota_equal treatment),
Quota_equal x Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed ratee in the Quota_equal treatment),
Unequal (dummy equal to one for ex-ante unequal treatment),
Unequal x Disadvantaged ratee (dummy equal to one for disadvantaged ratee in ex-ante unequal treatment),
Quota_unequal (dummy equal to one in Quota_unequal treatment),
Quota_unequal x Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed ratee in the Quota_unequal treatment),
Independent Rating (continuous variable with the mean evaluation of independent raters who are blind
to treatments). In all specifications robust standard errors are clustered by matching groups of eight
participants. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.7: Regression analysis independent ratings
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
Independent ratings Ex-ante equal Ex-ante unequal
Quota -0.125 -0.029
(0.150) (0.211)
Affirmed ratee -0.177 -0.229
(0.149) (0.238)
Disadvantaged ratee -0.495***
(0.183)
Constant 6.281*** 6.209***
(0.084) (0.130)
Observations 960 936
Number of participants 320 3212
Number of groups 40 40
Notes: Ordinary least squares linear model. Models include either ex-ante equal or
ex-ante unequal settings. The dependent variable is independent rating received.
Independent variables: Quota (dummy equal to one in treatments with a quota),
Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed ratee in the treatments with a quota),
Disadvantaged ratee (dummy equal to one for disadvantaged ratee in all treatments
involving less working time for disadvantaged type). In all specifications robust
standard errors are clustered by matching groups of eight participants.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.8: Regression analysis peer-reviews provided by rater type with control
for perceived procedural fairness
Dependent variable: Ex-ante equal Ex-ante unequal
Peer-review (1)
Affirmed
rater
(2)
Non-
affirmed
rater
(3)
Affirmed
rater
(4)
Non-
affirmed
rater
Quota 0.335 -0.315 0.619* -0.009
(0.282) (0.275) (0.353) (0.400)
Affirmed ratee -0.595*** 0.137 -0.702*** 0.112
(0.190) (0.088) (0.199) (0.178)
Disadvantaged ratee 0.000 0.073
(0.117) (0.144)
Independent rating 0.346*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.401***
(0.031) (0.025) (0.042) (0.035)
Fairness perception of rater 0.838*** 0.861*** 0.931*** 0.485***
(0.140) (0.138) (0.235) (0.150)
Constant -1.291*** -1.327*** -1.835*** -0.981**
(0.380) (0.392) (0.529) (0.436)
Observations 2,160 2,160 1,404 1,404
Number of participants 320 320 312 312
Number of groups 40 40 39 39
Notes: Two-way error component linear model, allowing for creator and evaluator random effects.
Separate models for affirmed and non-affirmed raters.
The dependent variable is peer-review received. Independent variables: Quota (dummy equal to
one in treatments with a quota), Affirmed ratee (dummy equal to one for affirmed ratees in the
treatments with a quota), Disadvantaged ratee (dummy equal to one for disadvantaged ratees in
all treatments involving less working time for disadvantaged type), Independent Rating
(continuousvariable with the mean evaluation of independent raters who are blind to treatments),
Fairness perception of rater (continuous variable with the rater’s evaluation of fairness as
elicited in the post-experimental questionnaire). In the ex-ante equal setting, all raters from
the Baseline_equal serve as a reference group for both affirmed and non-affirmed raters.
In the ex-ante unequal, disadvantaged raters from the Baseline_unequal treatment serve as
the reference group for affirmed raters, while the non-disadvantaged individuals from the
Baseline_unequal treatment serve as reference group for non-affirmed raters in the
Quota_unequal treatment. In all specifications robust standard errors are clustered
by matching groups of eight participants.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Experimental Instructions - Dictator Experiment
Instructions 
Welcome to this part of the experiment! Please carefully read through the following instructions. 
If you have questions, please raise your hand. We will then come over to you and answer your 
question. As before, all of your decisions are anonymous. Communication with other 
participants is not permitted for the duration of the experiment.  
The Experiment 
This experiment consists of four rounds. In each round you will be anonymously assigned to 
another participant and also assigned a role. At the beginning of each round, you will learn 
the other participant’s type (green or yellow) as well as your role (active or passive) in this 
round. Assignment to the player types (green or yellow) corresponds with the assignment from 
the first experiment. The roles will be newly assigned in each round.  
 The active participant has an endowment of 2.00 euros in each round.  
 The passive participant has an endowment of 0.00 euro in each round. 
 The active participant chooses how many euros (in 0.10 euro increments) he/she would 
like to transfer to the passive participant. 
A total of 4 rounds will be conducted in this experiment. The assignment of roles (active and 
passive) varies between each round, and you will be assigned to a different participant in each 
round.  
At the end of the experiment, one round will be randomly determined to be relevant for the 
payment. 
Payment 
 The active participant’s payment equals 2.00 euros minus the amount transferred in the 
round relevant for the payment, i.e., the active participant’s payment = 2.00 euros – 
transferred amount. 
 The passive participant’s payment equals 0.00 euro plus the amount transferred in the 
round relevant for the payment, i.e., the passive participant’s payment = 0.00 euro + 
transferred amount. 
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Chapter 4
The Hidden Cost of
Training1
“Human capital itself is not enough in order to make workers
productive, because skills are embodied in humans.”
Jörn-Steffen Pischke (2005)
4.1 Introduction
Skilled labor is an important driver of innovation and thus economic growth
(R. Lucas 1988; S. Black and Lynch 1996; Fernald and Jones 2014). Especially
in developed economies, tasks are becoming more skill-intensive (Acemoglu and
Pischke 1999; Autor and Handel 2013). One way for employers to boost labor
productivity is to invest in training to enhance the individual’s skill set, i.e.,
human capital, and thereby increase the productivity potential of the respec-
tive employee (G. Becker 1962). A recently published training industry report
surveying a representative sample of organizations with 100 or more employees
in the United States, finds that training expenditures increased to a total of
90.6 billion US Dollars (Training Magazine 2017). OECD (2011) estimates that
an individual spends on average 715 hours in job-related non-formal education
over the course of a working life.
Previous research has tried to pin down the returns of training both for the
employer in form of productivity gains, and for the employee in form of higher
wages. However, as training can take many different forms and is mostly a
result of non-exogenous processes, estimating its effects poses an ambitious re-
search endeavour (Heckman 2000; Pischke 2005). Thus, it is not surprising that
depending on the estimation strategy and the specific dataset, the estimated
training effects vary widely (see Bassanini et al. 2007, for an overview). With
respect to the productivity effect of training, the literature is relatively scarce
since productivity is inherently hard to measure and often not comparable across
1This chapter is based upon Petters (2019)
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different organizations. Therefore, this strand of literature mostly relies on firm-
level data and estimates productivity gains ranging between 5 and 20% (Mincer
1962; Holzer, R. Block, et al. 1993; Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2000; De
Grip and Sauermann 2011; Adhvaryu, Kala, and Nyshadham 2018). With re-
spect to the effect of training on wages, the literature finds very high effect sizes
as well as insignificant and close to zero effects (Lynch 1992; Booth 1993; Veum
1995; Blundell et al. 1999; Parent 1999; Pischke 2001; Frazis and Loewenstein
2005). However, selection bias and the resulting heterogeneity between trained
and untrained workers might lead to overestimating the training effects. Those
studies with cleaner identification strategies consistently find lower effect sizes
(Blundell et al. 1999; Leuven and Oosterbeek 2004; Leuven and Oosterbeek
2008; Adhvaryu, Kala, and Nyshadham 2018).
In this chapter, we formalize a theoretical framework that acknowledges the
fact that the production function of human labor is more complex compared to
other input factors as it might be subject to behavioral responses to the envi-
ronment. We argue that, additional to the effect of training on the skill level
of an employee (G. Becker 1964), training might also affect wage expectations
of the respective employee.2 In other words, training increases the “fair wage”
as coined by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). According to their fair wage-effort hy-
pothesis, the employee evaluates his actual wage against this “fair wage”, which
if below results in a feeling of being underpaid and unfairly treated. To com-
pensate for this perceived loss, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) predict a reduction
of employee’s effort. When we understand labor productivity as a function of
skills and effort, and apply our argument based on the fair wage-effort hypoth-
esis, training can, ceteris paribus, generate two effects affecting productivity in
different directions: a direct positive effect on skills, and an indirect negative
effect on effort, which works through a shift in wage expectations. However,
which of the two countervailing effects of training dominates, ulimately poses
an empirical question. Additionally, the specific size of the two effects might
vary between individuals and with the specific environment in which training is
provided.
We use field and experimental data to study the relationship between training
participation and fair wage expectations as well as the behavioral consequences
following from this. First, we use an extensive matched employer-employee
dataset on vocational training from Germany to provide first evidence on the
positive relationship between training participation and wage expectations. Sec-
ond, in order to explore the different behavioral channels, we develop a novel
experimental design which allows us to induce our treatment variations in a
controlled environment and to specifically measure the variables of interest. We
apply an employer-employee gift-exchange setting, in which employees work for
a fixed wage on a real-effort decoding task for the benefit of the employer. In a
two-by-two design we exogenously assign training and wage increases and cap-
ture how employees respond with respect to measures for the fair wage, effort
and overall productivity. The experimental results strengthen the hypothesized
2Our proposed mechanism is in line with the findings by Bolton and Werner (2016), who
show that higher productivity leads to higher entitlements and thus wage demands (also
compare Gächter and Riedl 2005). Similarly we argue that the increase in skills related to
training might come along with a feeling of being entitled to a higher wage which results in
adapted wage expectations.
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relationship between training participation and higher fair wage expectations.
Furthermore, we find that training can be ineffective in increasing overall pro-
ductivity. Even though training increases the skills and thus productivity poten-
tial in our experiment, the employee’s potential might not be realized because of
lower efforts on the intensive and extensive margin. Additional analyses of het-
erogenous effects suggest that fairness considerations are the driving mechanism
for this result.
Numerous studies have emphasized the importance of fairness in economic de-
cision making in general (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) and reciprocal behavior in partic-
ular (see Fehr, Goette, and Zehnder 2009, for an overview). Mas (2006) for
example presents field evidence from police officers in New Jersey showing that
the distance from the subjective fair wage affects police performance. Ockenfels,
Sliwka, and Werner (2014) find similar results for managers in a large company
when bonus payments fall short of expectations. While Cohn, Fehr, and Goette
(2015) show in a field experiment that only workers that felt underpaid be-
fore react with increased efforts after having received a pay raise. The results
obtained by Abeler et al. (2010) in a laboratory study imply that only equity-
based wages related to individual productivity are being perceived as fair. If
this fairness norm is violated by paying equal wages, they observe substantially
lower efforts. Similarly, Breza, Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018) show in a field ex-
periment with Indian manufacturing workers that pay disparity among a group
of seemingly similar co-workers results in lower output, higher absenteeism and
lower group cohesion. This effect vanishes once these differences in wages are
justified by differences in productivity.
This project contributes to the existing literature in several ways. We present
a theoretical framework as well as empirical evidence, using both field and ex-
perimental data, for a behavioral mechanism that might impair the returns to
training. In particular, we show that skill-enhancing training leads to higher
wages being perceived as fair, which if not paid accordingly results in a reduc-
tion of effort. Therefore, efficiency gains related to training might not necessar-
ily translate into higher productivity. As a result, the effectiveness of training
might be underestimated by firms and institutions and thus lead to lower train-
ing investments.
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4.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
To illustrate the main idea, we develop a theoretical framework which includes
training as an additional factor in the productivity of labor function. We model
productivity of labor YL as a function of effort e and skills s: YL = F (e, s)
which is increasing in both arguments, i.e., ∂YL∂e > 0 and
∂YL
∂s > 0. Training
then serves as a mean to increase the current skill level of the trained employee,
i.e., s(t) with ∂s∂t > 0.
In line with the fair wage-effort-hypothesis as stated by Akerlof and Yellen
(1990), we model effort as a function of the wage w relative to some fair wage
w∗. The wage which is considered as fair, however, might as well depend on
the acquired skill level as it is directly related to the employee’s productivity
potential, i.e., w∗(s(t)) with ∂w∗∂s > 0. Hypothesis 1 follows.
Hypothesis 1: Training participation increases expectations towards a fair
wage.
Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume that e = min( ww∗(s(t)) , 1) with
∂e
∂w ≥ 0, ∂e∂w∗ ≤ 0. Thus, if the actual wage falls below the fair wage, effort is
adjusted accordingly and only a fraction of “normal effort” (normalized to 1) is
provided. Given Hypothesis 1, our model also predicts a negative effort response
related to training participation (if the actual wage lies below what would be
considered fair).
Hypothesis 2: Training participation decreases effort provision.
As in the standard model, our model integrates a gift-exchange setting and thus
predicts that a higher wage evokes more reciprocal behavior by the employee in
the form of increased effort (in case “nomal effort” was not yet provided).
Hypothesis 3: A higher wage increases effort provision.
When training is combined with a higher wage, the effect on effort is ambiguous
since both affect effort provision in different directions.
Integrating the adapted skill and effort functions, we can derive a productivity
of labor function which takes training as an additional argument:
YL = F (e(min(
w
w∗(s(t)) , 1)), s(t))
This revised productivity of labor function indicates that training has two po-
tentially countervailing effects. On the one hand, training has a direct effect on
skills, which in turn should positively affect overall productivity of labor, i.e.,
∂F
∂s
∂s
∂t > 0. On the other hand, training has an effect on the fair wage, which
indirectly affects productivity of labor negatively through its effect on effort,
i.e., ∂F∂e
∂e
∂w∗
∂w∗
∂s
∂s
∂t ≤ 0.
In a first step, we study the relationship between training and wage expectations
(Hypothesis 1) using an extensive field dataset. This hypothesis constitutes
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the core novelty of our approach and serves as the underlying assumption for
our revised version of the productivity of labor function. In a next step, we
test all hypotheses derived from our theoretical framework (Hypotheses 1-3)
in a laboratory experiment. The experimental setting allows us to exogenously
assign trainig and wages and to investigate the specific mechanisms with respect
to skills, effort, and overall productivity in a controlled environment.
4.3 Evidence from Field Data
We begin by presenting evidence of the relationship between training participa-
tion and future wage expectations based on a linked employer-employee survey
dataset. We use the German dataset WeLL (Further training as a part of life-
long learning), which was collected by the Research Data Centre of the Federal
Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (FDZ) in four
consecutive years from 2007 to 2010. The questionnaire specifically focuses on
employees’ training activities (see Bender, Fertig, et al. 2009, for detailed in-
formation on the dataset). Furthermore, we link this dataset to administrative
records of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) to be able to control for
observed wages, employment experience and tenure.3 We limit the sample to
full-time workers covered by social security, for whom we have information on all
variables used in our estimations. This leaves us with a total of 2,274 employees
employed in 143 different establishments4 and a total of 3,592 observations.
The main outcome variable to address the first part of our research question
relates to the survey question: “Assuming you are employed in 12 months from
now. What is the minimum/maximum monthly income (taxes and social secu-
rity contritbutions already deducted), you will earn in total given your current
assessment?”. The mean of the minimum and the maximum monthly expected
income stated in this questions serves as our proxy for fair wage expectations.
General training participation is captured with the following survey question:
“Did you particpate in any seminars, lectures, courses or trainings of profes-
sional development within the time span of January [previous year] through to-
day?”.
To account for the potential unobserved heterogeneity between the group of
trained and untrained employees and thus potentially biased estimates, we cre-
ate an alternative control group following previous approaches in the training
literature (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2008; Dietz and Zwick 2016). We use the
information of already scheduled training activities that have been cancelled
because of reasons beyond the employees’ control, i.e., cancellations by the or-
ganizer or because of a job at work with high priority. With this, we address
3Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social
Sciences as well as remote data access.
4The sample selection followed a two-step procedure. First, the sample of establishments
was drawn from the IAB Establishment Panel and stratified according to establishment size,
sector, location, further training activities and investment activities. Second, a sample of em-
ployees where drawn from the total of employees employed in these establishments. Therefore,
the sample is not representative of German establishments in general, but for the purpose of
studying in-firm further training activities focuses on establishments which support employee
training.
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the selection bias into training by using a control group which intended to par-
ticipate in training, but was not able to because of exogenous reasons. Table
4.5 in the appendix to this chapter provides summary statistics for all variables
used in our estimations.
To analyze the relationship between wage expectations and training participa-
tion, we regress expected monthly income in Euros on a training dummy, which
constitutes our main explanatory variable (see table 4.1). The dummy variable
equals one if the employee participated in training and zero if the employee had
scheduled a training but could not participate because of exogenous reasons.
We estimate our results using ordinary least squares regressions. In specifica-
tion (1), we only include year fixed effects to control for the economic situation
in that year. Specification (2) additionally controls for employee characteristics,
which capture age, education, occupational status, firm tenure and labor market
experience. We follow a lagged dependent variable approach in specification (3)
and include mean expected monthly income in Euros in the previous year as an
additional variable, in order to control for unobserved factors which might affect
wage expectations such as, for example, general career aspirations. Specification
(4) additionally includes establishment characteristics and establishment fixed
effects.
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the regression results. In specification (1), we find
a highly significant and sizeable positive relationship between training partici-
pation and expected monthly income. Employees who have been trained in the
previous year on average expect to earn a monthly income which is around 300
Euros higher compared to employees in our control group. Specification (2),
however, shows that even though we apply the restriction of exogenous non-
participation in already scheduled training to the control group, the two groups
still differ with respect to individual characteristics. When we include individ-
ual controls, the coefficient substantially drops, but remains highly statistically
significant. Including the wage expectations from the previous year as an ad-
ditional control reduces the estimated coefficient further to around 51 Euros
(compare specification (3)). Also in the last specification, which contains estab-
lishment fixed effects, we find a significant effect of training participation on the
expected monthly income. The average difference in expected earnings between
training participants and exogenous non-participants estimated in specification
(4) amounts to around 53 Euros. Given that employees in the dataset on aver-
age stated an expected monthly income of around 2,434 Euros, this equals an
expected increased pay of 2.2% following training participation.
In line with our hypothesis, we find that employees adjust their expectations
about future earnings when they participated in training. Thus, the field results
provide empirical support for Hypothesis 1.
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4.4 Experimental Evidence
While our results from the WeLL dataset provide support for the prediction
that training participation affects fair wage expectations, factors such as the
great variety of contents and types of trainings and the potentially very dif-
ferent reasons behind training participation (career incentives, outside options,
new job requirements, job security) could bias our estimates from field data.
Even though we use an alternative control group of exogenous non-participants
to address selection into training, we can not fully eliminate any potential endo-
geneity concerns. Additionally, to test all of our research hypotheses related to
the specific behavioral mechanisms behind training participation, we need reli-
able and comparable productivity measures with respect to the task addressed
within the training, as well as measures for skills and effort. Therefore, we de-
signed a laboratory experiment in which we, as a first step, aim to replicate our
results from the field and, as a second step, test the hypothesized mechanisms
in a controlled environment.
4.4.1 Experimental Design
We introduce a novel experimental design to study the causal effect of training
participation on the perceived fair wage and its consequences for effort and final
productivity outcomes in a gift-exchange setting. In the experiment, we exoge-
nously vary whether an employee (i) participates in a skill-enhancing training
and whether he (ii) receives a wage increase afterwards. In addition to produc-
tivity measures, we elicit a measure of the norm with respect to fair wages in
order to be able to analyze whether this is the relevant channel for the hypoth-
esized effects.
The experiment consists of five incentivized parts and a questionnaire after the
conclusion of the experiment. Upon arrival, participants are randomly seated
and receive general instructions about the experiment (see the appendix to
this chapter for the experimental instructions), which are also read aloud by
the experimenter. In order to make sure that the general conditions of the
experiment are well understood, participants have to pass a number of control
questions before being able to start the main part of the experiment. The
experiment is framed as an employer-employee setting in which four employees
are matched to one employer. Employees are paid a fixed wage and asked to work
on a real-effort decoding task which benefits the employer. The employer only
plays a limited role in the experiment, however, she is the one who implements
our treatment variations by determining which two of the four employees are
trained and which two of the four employees receive a wage increase.
The chronological structure of the experiment is as follows (see figure 4.1 for
an overview of the general structure of the experiment). Employees start with
working for ten minutes on the real-effort task (first working phase). Subse-
quently, the first fair wage norm elicitation takes place. At the same time, the
employer determines whether the respective employee will participate in training
or can enjoy free time and use the internet for ten minutes. After the conclusion
of this phase, the second fair wage norm elicitation takes place. Again, simulta-
neously the employer determines the respective wage levels. Following this, the
4.4. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE 77
employees are informed about their wage for the second working phase and the
second working phase starts, which again lasts for ten minutes.
Figure 4.1: Experimental structure
The experiment was conducted in February and June 2018 at the Cologne Lab-
oratory for Economic Research (CLER). A total of 480 subjects (96 employers
and 384 employees) took part in 16 experimental sessions. During the exper-
iment, earnings were denoted in experimental currency units (ECU) and only
converted into Euros at the end of the experiment (exchange rate: 100 ECU
= 1 Euro). Average earnings for participation in the experiment amounted to
17.70 Euros for an approximate total duration of 75 minutes. Participants were
recruited through the online recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and
the experiment was programmed using Java and oTree software (D. L. Chen,
Schonger, and Wickens 2016).
Real-Effort Decoding Task
In each of the two working phases, employees work for ten minutes on a real-
effort decoding task similar to the encoding task used by Erkal, Gangadharan,
and Nikiforakis (2011). Employees are given a seven-digit sequence of numbers
and a decoding table that enables them to decode the sequence into a meaningful
word. For an examplary screen see figure 4.2, which shows the seven-digit
sequence of 26 29 6 11 20 5. Given the decoding table in the lower part of
the screen, we find that 26 = S, 29 = T, 6 = A, 11 = I, 20 = O, and 5 =
N, and can derive that the corresponding word is “station”. All employees
are presented the same sequences of numbers and decoding tables in the same
predefined order. Once a word is correctly decoded and the solution is sent,
the next screen with a new decoding task appears. For each working phase the
employees receive a fixed wage, which amounts to 350 ECU in the first working
phase, and 350 ECU or 500 ECU respectively in the second working phase.
At the same time the employer receives 25 ECU for each correctly decoded
word by her employees. Employees are informed at all times of their respective
fixed wage for the current working phase, the number of correctly decoded
words and the resulting payoff they generated for their respective employer (see
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figure 4.2 in the appendix to this chapter). It is common information that
neither the employer nor the employees receive information about the (other)
employees’ performance at any point in the experiment. Therefore, we can
rule out any social comparison or reputation effects as an explanation of our
treatment effects. Since the experiment resembles a gift-exchange setting, the
employees can freely choose how much time they spend on working on the task
itself and how much time they take for each task during the working phases
of 10 minutes. But in any case they have to sit in front of the screen and are
required not to engage in any other unrelated activities, such as using their
phone or reading.
Figure 4.2: Screenshot real-effort decoding task
Fair Wage Norm Elicitation
We use a mechanism adapted from Krupka and Weber (2013) to elicit the social
norm with respect to the fair wage. We ask employees for their expected fairness
response of comparable employees, i.e., employees that have passed through the
same phases as they did. For this, employees have to rate each of the respective
wage levels for the second working phase on a scale of “very unfair”, “somewhat
unfair”, “somewhat fair” to “very fair” (see figure 4.4 in the appendix to this
chapter for an exemplary screen). This fairness measurement is elicited for 16
different wage levels between “less than 50 ECU “ and “more than 700 ECU”.
We use the wage level at which employees change their evaluation from “some-
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what fair” to “very fair” as a proxy for the fair wage in our later analyses.5 The
elicitation is incentivized with a small additional bonus of 50 ECU that employ-
ees receive if they correctly stated the modal fairness response for a randomly
chosen wage level.6 We elicit this measure twice. The first elicitation takes
place after the first working phase is concluded. Given that our randomization
into treatments worked, we should not find any differences between treatments.
Therefore, the first measurement mainly serves as an additional control variable
to reduce noise as it is highly correlated with the second elicitation. The second
elicitation takes place after the training phase is concluded and before the wage
for the second working phase is announced.
Training/Free Time
Between the two working phases, employees either participated in a training
phase (called “trained employees” in the following) or enjoyed free time in which
they were given the possibility to surf the internet (called “untrained employees”
in the following). In the training phase, employees were shown similar screens
as before, but in this phase a short animation showed them the decoding of
the numbers into letters up to the point where the correct solution was visible
(see figure 4.5 in the appendix to this chapter for an exemplary screen). Then
the animation stopped and employees were asked to type in the correct word
themselves. If this was not done within 15 seconds, the next screen with a new
task was shown. It was common information for employees that took part in
the training phase, that every second decoding task in the second working phase
will consist of a task that was already practiced in the training phase. Since the
solutions to the decoding tasks were actual words, trained employees should be
able to remember those words and therefore decode the respective words faster.
Thus, the training should enable the trained employees to decode more words
in the second working phase compared to untrained employees.
Treatments
Our treatment variations consist of whether an employee participates in training
and whether he receives a wage increase in the second working phase (which is
only announced after the second fair wage norm elicitation). Unlike in most ex-
perimental studies, our treatments take place simultaneously within one session
and the assignment of employees to treatment groups is implemented over the
course of the experiment (see figure 4.1 for the chronological structure of the
experiment). Both the training decision as well as the decision on the wage level
for the second working phase are determined by the employer. As the employer
5This means that we potentially lack this measurement for agents that never evaluated
any wage level as “very fair”. However using alternative measures as robustness checks, e.g.,
the mean fairness evaluation or the wage level that was first considered as “somewhat fair”,
does not change the results.
6While the social norm with respect to the fair wage offers the convenience of being
incentivizable, it might at the same time be only a noisy measure for the individual fair-
ness perception. To account for this, we also elicited the non-incentivized version in a pilot
study (N=21) and found that both measures are highly correlated (Pearson-correlation: 0.66,
p<0.01). Therefore, we henceforth use the social norm as a proxy for individual fairness
perceptions.
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has no information about the performance or any other characteristics of her
employees and can only choose between two (for her) arbitrary options, i.e., giv-
ing training to employee 1 and 2 or employee 3 and 4 and giving a wage increase
to employee 1 and 3 or employee 2 and 4, the treatments are exogenous. Hence,
treatments are randomly assigned while at the same time the chosen procedure
ensures that subjects in the role of the employees perceive that employers have
an impact on their training participation and wages.
Figure 4.3 summarizes the four different treatments and the number of indepen-
dent observations from employees7, which form the data basis for the following
analysis. Treatment group T0 forms our control group, which receives no train-
ing and no wage increase in the second working phase, i.e., 350 ECU as in the
first working phase. Employees in treatment group T1 receive no training, but
a wage increase in the second working phase, i.e., 500 ECU, while in treatment
group T2 they receive training, but no wage increase in the second working
phase, i.e., 350 ECU as in the first working phase. Finally, when in treatment
group T3, employees receive both training and a wage increase in the second
working phase, i.e., 500 ECU.
Figure 4.3: Treatments
After the experiment is concluded, subjects in the role of employees are paid
their respective wages for both working phases as well as any additional bonuses
resulting from the fair wage norm elicitations. Only one of the two working
phases is randomly chosen for the payout of subjects in the role of the employer
in order to avoid employees hedging working efforts between the two working
phases. On top of their generated payments, all subjects receive a show-up fee
for participation in the experiment.
4.4.2 Results
In this section, we present evidence from our experimental data to test the pre-
dictions from our theoretical framework. First, we focus on the effect of training
7Nine observations had to be discarded because of technical problems during the experi-
ment.
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participation on fair wage expectations (Hypothesis 1). Second, we study the
effect of training and wages on our measure of effort (Hypotheses 2 and 3). In
our analyses, we additionally study the role of fairness perceptions by analyzing
heterogenous effects on subgroups with different fair wage expectations. Finally,
we analyze how training participation affects realized productivity.
Fair Wage Norm (Hypothesis 1)
We use the elicited fair wage norm as a proxy for fair wage expectations. De-
scriptively we find that untrained employees report on average a fair wage norm
of about 482 ECU for the second working phase (see table 4.7 in the appendix
to this chapter for the complete summary statistics). Trained employees state a
significantly higher level of 530 ECU as fair (p<0.01, Mann-Whitney test, two-
sided). In table 4.2, we present the corresponding regression analysis with the
fair wage norm as elicited in the second elicitation as the dependent variable
and a training dummy as the independent variable. At the point of the sec-
ond fair wage norm elicitation our treatment variations with respect to wages
have not become effective yet, which is why we group both treatments with
training (T2 and T3) together and compare them against the baseline of no
training (T0 and T1). In specification (1) we only control for the fair wage
norm as elicited before the training or free time respectively, specification (2)
includes additional control variables such as session fixed effects, gender and
measures for envy, competitiveness, guilt and reciprocity as elicited from the
post-experimental questionnaire.
We find that employees that received the training state a significantly higher
fair wage norm, which exceeds that of untrained employees by around 50 ECU,
i.e., 10%. The result is robust to including additional control variables.
Result 1: Trained employees state significantly higher fair wage expectations
compared to untrained employees.
The findings support the conjecture that an increased productivity potential
as a result of skill-enhancing training8 comes along with higher expectations of
what consitutes a fair wage.9 Therefore, the results we found in our field data
8See table 4.8 in the appendix to this chapter for the effect of training on the time needed
to correctly decode a word as a proxy for skills. While, to some extent, this measure also
captures effort on the intensive margin, our training intervention constitutes a skill shock only
for those words that have been shown in the previous training phase. We find that those
employees that received training (T2 and T3) are significantly faster in decoding the trained
words. However, only for employees that received a wage increase in addition to training (T3),
this also leads to an overall decrease in average decoding time.
9Given the previous literature on entitlements related to higher productivity potential
(Gächter and Riedl 2005; Bolton and Werner 2016) and the salience of the productivity effect
of our training intervention (i.e., the words shown in the training are known to appear in
the second working phase again), we focus on this channel. However, we acknowledge that
additional factors, such as the (perceived) investment of time and effort within the training,
might play a role as well by affecting the size of the former effect. We find suggestive evidence
for this relationship. For example, it seems to be of relevance how enjoyable agents found
the training. Those who reported to have enjoyed participating in the training more, stated
a significantly lower fair wage norm after the training compared to agents who did not enjoy
the training to the same extent (p<0.1, t-test, two-sided).
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can also be replicated in a laboratory setting which provides further evidence
in favor of Hypothesis 1.
Table 4.2: Fair wage norm
Dependent variable:
Fair wage norm (1) (2)
Training 47.934*** 49.237***
(13.069) (13.045)
Fair wage norm - pre training/free time 0.788*** 0.779***
(0.053) (0.061)
Constant 58.852** 71.389
(29.521) (43.787)
Additional controls No Yes
Observations 356 352
R-squared 0.379 0.403
Notes: Linear ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Additional control variables include: session fixed effects, gender, questionnaire
measures for envy, competitiveness, guilt, and reciprocity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Time Invested (Hypotheses 2 and 3)
We analyze the time invested as a proxy for effort on the extensive margin.
Since time working on the task is not contracted in our experimental setting,
employees can freely choose for how long they are willing to work on the task
within the time frame of ten minutes. Table 4.3 shows a linear regression with
the time invested, i.e., the point in time at which the respective employee de-
coded his last word, as the dependent variable and dummies for each treatment
group as independent variables. We also control for the time invested in the
first working phase. As before, we show specifications without and with addi-
tional controls for the fair wage norm as elicited before the training/free time,
session fixed effects, gender and measures for envy, competitiveness, guilt and
reciprocity as elicited from the post-experimental questionnaire. In specification
(1) and (2), we analyze all employees in one model. According to the theoretical
framework, however, effort provision is determined by whether or not the wage
falls below what is perceived as fair. For this reason, we additionally analyze
heterogenous effects of our treatment interventions by splitting the sample into
subgroups of employees that stated a fair wage norm below or equal to 500 ECU
(specifications (3) and (4)) and employees that stated a fair wage norm of above
500 ECU (specifications (5) and (6)). 500 ECU corresponds to the wage level
employees were paid when they received a wage increase.10
10We split the sample by this fixed cutoff of 500 ECU (instead of using whether the actual
wage falls below the stated fair wage norm) in order to create a more comparable control
group (i.e., employees that perceive 350 ECU as fair might be inherently different, e.g., very
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Overall (specifications (1) and (2)), we only find suggestive evidence (p<0.15,
t-test, two-sided) for a negative effect of training on the time invested for the
group of employees who only received training (T2). These employees reduce
the time invested to work on the task by around 0.4 minutes (24 seconds), which
is significantly less compared to employees that did not receive training but a
wage increase (T1) (p<0.05/0.07, Wald test, two-sided). We do not find any
significant effects for employees that received only a wage increase (T1), nor for
employees that received training combined with a wage increase (T3). When
we, however, split the sample according to whether the stated fair wage norm
lies below (or is equal to) or above 500 ECU, we find strong heterogeneities
between the two groups.
For the group of employees who stated a fair wage norm below or equal to
500 ECU (specification (3) and (4)), we find no significant negative effects of
training on effort provision. A wage increase that pays a wage that the respective
employee stated as fair (T1), seems to have a (weakly) positive effect on effort
provision.
When we, however, focus on the group of employees that are paid below what
they stated as fair, a wage increase (T1) has no significant on the time invested
to work on the task. With respect to training, we find a significant negative
effect on effort provision - even when employees received a wage increase (T2
and T3). In both treatments employees significantly reduce the time invested
to work on the task by around 0.7 minutes (42 seconds).11
Result 2: Only if employees are paid below what they perceive as fair, training
reduces effort provision.
Our results show that our predicted effects highly depend on whether the respec-
tive employee perceives the paid wage as fair. Only for employees that stated
a fair wage norm below or equal to 500 ECU, we find suggestive evidence for
a positive effort effect of a wage increase as outlined in Hypothesis 3. For this
group, we also do not find any negative effort response to training. However,
for the group of employees with a fair wage norm above 500 ECU, which means
they fall below their fair wage in all treatments, we find a negative effect of
training on effort provision, which provides support for Hypothesis 2.
altruistic, compared to employees that perceive 500 ECU as fair). Additionally, with this
we divide the data into more similar subgroups with respect to sample size. The alternative
specifications, however, provide qualitatively similar results (see table 4.10 in the appendix to
this chapter).
11These results are also similar to findings reported in Sauermann (2019). In the field
experiment with agents in a call center, trained agents increase their performance on a single
task, i.e., the handling time of a customer call. However, at the same time they significantly
decrease the number of hours worked and show a higher number of absence days. These
results, while interpreted in a different manner, are in line with the theoretical framework and
experimental results presented in this chapter.
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Decoded Words
In this section, we study the effect of training and wage increase on the overall
productivity of labor. In the context of our experimental task, the number of
decoded words constitutes our measure of productivity. As before, we use a lin-
ear regression analysis with the number of decoded words in the second working
phase as the dependent variable and treatment group dummies as independent
variables. Since the number of decoded words in the first working phase is highly
predictive of the number of words decoded in the second working phase, we con-
trol for this in all specifications. As in the previous analyses, we include further
control variables such as the fair wage norm elicited before the training/free
time, session fixed effects, gender and measures for envy, competitiveness, guilt
and reciprocity as elicited from the post-experimental questionnaire in a second
stage. Again, we first analyze all observations in one model (specification (1)
and (2)), and then study potential heterogenous effects by splitting the sample
into employees that state a fair wage norm below (or equal to) 500 ECU (spec-
ification (3) and (4)) and above 500 ECU (specification (5) and (6)). Table 4.4
gives an overview of the results.
Overall, we find that both treatment groups that received a wage increase, i.e.,
T1 and T3, are significantly more productive compared to the baseline group
T0, which neither participated in training nor received a wage increase. These
employees decode on average 1.6 (1.7) and 1.9 (2.0) respectively more compared
to the baseline. This corresponds to an overall productivity increase of 6.1%
(6.4%) and 7.2% (7.6%). Training alone (T2), however, does not lead to a
significant increase in the number of decoded words. Also, the difference in
productivity between T1 and T3 is not statistically significant (p>0.74, Wald
test, two-tailed).
Once we split the sample, we find that the overall positive productivity effects
are solely driven by the group of employees which state a fair wage norm below
or equal to 500 ECU (specification (3) and (4)). In this group, we find that em-
ployees who receive a wage increase only (T1) decode on average 2.5 (2.7) words
more, which amounts to an increase of 9.5% (10.2%) compared to the baseline.
Additionally, we find suggestive evidence that, for this group, also training alone
(T2) has a positive productivity effect, showing that trained employees on aver-
age decode 2.3 (1.7) words more, which corresponds to a productivity increase of
about 8.7% (6.4%) compared to the baseline. For employees who received train-
ing combined with a wage increase that pays a wage they consider as fair (T3),
the positive productivity effect is especially pronounced. This group decodes
on average 4.0 (4.4) words more compared to the baseline, which constitutes
an increase in productivity of 15.2% (16.7%). Additionally, we find suggestive
evidence that the combination of training with a wage increase is also more
effective than either training or a wage increase alone (p<0.19 for comparison
T1 and T3 and p<0.07 for comparison T2 and T3, Wald test, two-tailed).
For employees that are paid below what they stated as a fair wage norm, we do
not find any significant productivity effects of the wage increase, the training,
nor the combination of both (specification (5) and (6)).12
12Even though we also find a training effect with respect to the decoding time of trained
words for this group of employees (see table 4.9 in the appendix to this chapter).
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Result 3: Only if employees perceive their wage as fair, training also leads to
higher productivity.
We interpret the findings as follows. It seems that the distance between the
perceived fair wage and the actual wage is of high importance for determining
whether or not the respective employee is willing to release his productivity
potential. If this gap is (almost) closed, both higher wages and training are
effective means to increase productivity. Paying a higher wage targets the effort
channel of labor productivity by evoking reciprocal behavior on the side of the
employee. Training an employee focuses on the skill channel of productivity of
labor as it increases the employee’s productivity potential. By paying a wage
that is perceived as fair (even after being trained), the employer can prevent a
negative effort response and thus effectively increase productivity through the
skill channel. When, however, the employee’s pay falls below what he perceives
as fair, neither training nor higher wages are effective for increasing labor pro-
ductivity.
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4.5 Conclusion
Much research has been devoted to examining the effect of training on pro-
ductivity and wages. We add to this literature by challenging the approach to
consider the two effects independently from each other. Instead, we propose
an additional behavioral mechanism according to which the wage the employee
considers fair is shifted as a response to training. In turn, these increased wage
expectations might affect the productivity-enhancing effect of training if the
higher productivity potential is not compensated appropriately.
We find support for the hypothesized relationship between training participation
and fair wage expectations both in field and laboratory settings. Additionally,
our experimental results give insight into the specific behavioral mechanisms
following training participation. While training can be effective in increasing
the skills and thus productivity potential of an employee, our results indicate
that this does not translate into productivity gains per se. Instead, a reduction
of the time invested in working on the task, i.e., effort on the extensive margin,
hinders the realization of the full productivity potential.13 Only when combined
with a wage increase that is considered fair will higher skills also lead to higher
productivity.
It seems that, as suggested by the theoretical framework, only when the gap
between the fair wage and the actual wage is closed, the employee is willing
to release his productivity potential. Otherwise the increased skills might be
substituted for effort. This implies that employers who want to effectively turn
training investments into higher productivity, need to let their employees partic-
ipate in the gains from training in a way that agents perceive as fair. Previous
literature on the relationship between training and wages (compare section 4.1),
however, suggests that employees in many cases benefit from training, i.e., in-
creased wages, only to a very limited extent. Thus, firms might not be aware of
the relationship between training and wage expectations. Not sharing the po-
tential gains could leave a significant fraction of output potential in an economy
untapped.
Our research adds an important behavioral factor to the cost-benefit analysis
of firms and institutions when deciding whether or not to invest in training.
We find empirical evidence for a trade-off between an increased skill level and
higher wage demands, which can lead to subsequent negative effort responses.
Therefore, returns on investment for firms might be lower than expected and in
turn might lead to lower human capital investments by firms.
13Withdrawing effort can take various forms in the work environment. Similar to what we
observe in our experiment, employees could increase shirking by, for example, taking longer
breaks, distracting themselves with private affairs or slacking off when doing their work tasks.
An increased efficiency resulting from higher skills also allows employees to finish their regular
workload faster and thus to work less overtime and leave the office earlier. This would therefore
be another way to recoup their share of the gains from training and would not result in a
productivity gain per se.
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Experimental Instructions
 
Instructions 
 
Welcome to this experiment! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Do not hesitate to ask any questions. If you 
have any question, please, raise your hand. We will approach you and answer your question 
in private.  
All your decisions remain anonymous. Communication with other participants during the whole 
experiment is not allowed. Please remove all items you brought with you from the table, switch 
off your phone and store the phone in your bag.  
For showing up, you receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros. In the following experiment you can 
earn more money.  
The money, you earn during the experiment, will be expressed in ECU (=Experimental 
Currency) and will be converted into Euros at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate is 
as follows, for 100 ECU you will be paid 1 Euro at the end of the experiment.  
There are two different roles within this experiment: Employer and Employees. At the 
beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to either one of these roles. The 
role assigned to you, will be shown on your screen at the beginning of this experiment and will 
remain the same for the whole experiment. 
Every employer will be matched with four employees. You will neither during nor after the 
experiment know who was in the role of the employer or the employee, nor which employees 
were assigned to which employer.  
Every employee participates in two working phases, with each having a duration of 10 
minutes. During each working phase the employee is asked to work on a decoding task, where 
the employee is asked to translate numerical codes into words benefiting the employer.  
Decoding task:  
Within the decoding task numerical codes should be translated into words. To solve this 
task there is a decoding table beneath the numerical code, which matches each number 
with a letter (Please see example on page 2). With the aid of this decoding table the 
numerical code can be translated into a word.  
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Example: 
 
In the decoding table it is shown, that 28=D, 23=A, 16=M, 21=P, 13=F, 26=E, 27=R. Therefore, 
the word that is searched for is DAMPFER. 
Only if the numerical code is correctly decoded, you can approach the next numerical code. 
Each numerical code consists of a new numerical combination and each time there is a new 
decoding table shown. Each word only appears once during each working phase.  
At the top on the left hand side of the window, the employee is able to see the wage for the 
particular working phase, the amount of correctly decoded words, as well as the resulting 
amount of money for the employer. At the top on the right hand side, the employee is able 
to see the remaining time for the particular working phase.  
The employer will neither during nor after the experiment be informed about the amount 
of correctly decoded numerical codes by each employee.  
 
Employees’ pay-out 
The particular employee receives a fixed wage for each of the two working phases. This 
wage will be paid to the employee by the assigned employer independently of the number 
of correctly coded words.  
Employers’ pay-out 
One working phase will be randomly determined to be relevant for the employer’s pay-out.  
For each numerical code, that was correctly decoded by the particular employee in this 
particular working phase, the employer receives a fixed amount of money.  
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Screenshots Experiment
Figure 4.4: Screenshot fair wage elicitation
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Figure 4.5: Screenshot training
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Post-experimental Questionnaire
Cabin-No.: _____ 
 
 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Please, answer the following questions while we prepare the pay-out. 
Thank you! 
 
1. What is your gender? 
Female Male 
□ □ 
2. How old are you?  
3. How many siblings do you have?  
 
Please, answer the following questions using the given scale.  
4. How satisfied are you with the experiment overall? 
Not at all satisfied    Very satisfied 
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. How much would you like to participate again in an experiment like this one? 
Not at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6. How likely is it that you would recommend to participate in an experiment like this 
one to a friend? 
Not likely at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
In case you were assigned to the role of an employee, please answer the following questions.  
 
In case you were assigned to the role of an employer, we do not need any further 
information. Thank you very much for your participation.  
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7. How much did you enjoy the decoding task?  
Not at all  Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
8. How tedious did you find the decoding task?  
Not tedious at all  Very tedious 
□ □ □ □ □ 
9. How fair, do you think, was the wage in the first working phase?   
Not fair at all    Very fair 
□ □ □ □ □ 
10. Did you feel disadvantaged or advantaged by the wage in the first working phase?  
Very 
disadvantaged 
   Very advantaged 
□ □ □ □ □ 
11. What do you think, how was your performance in the first working phase compared to 
other participants in this room?   
Below average    Above average  
□ □ □ □ □ 
12. How fair, do you think, was the wage in the second working phase?   
Not fair at all  Very fair 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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13. Did you feel disadvantaged or advantaged by the wage in the second working phase? 
Very 
disadvantaged  
   Very advantaged  
□ □ □ □ □ 
14. What do you think, how was your performance in the second working phase compared to 
other participants in this room?   
Below average    Above average 
□ □ □ □ □ 
 
15. Did you decode more, about the same or fewer numerical codes in the second working 
phase compared to the first working phase?  
 
More About the same Fewer 
□ □ □ 
 
16. For what reason did you decode more, about the same or fewer numerical codes in the 
second working phase compared to the first working phase?  
 
For the success of this study, it is very crucial, that we understand why you decoded more, 
about the same or fewer numerical codes in the second working phase. Please, answer as 
precise and detailed as possible. Thank you very much.  
 
Answer:  
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Did you participate in a training phase before the second working phase?  
Yes 
□ 
No 
□ 
 
In case the answer is no, please skip this 
page and continue on the next page.  
17. How much did you enjoy the training phase?  
Not at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
18. How tedious did you find the training phase? 
Not tedious at all    Very tedious 
□ □ □ □ □ 
19. Do you believe that the training has enabled you to correctly decode more numerical codes 
in the second working phase?  
Not at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
20. Do you believe that your employer had an advantage in the second working phase, because 
you participated in the training phase?   
Not at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
21. Why (not)?     
Answer: 
22. Are you of the opinion that the participation in the training phase should go along with a 
higher wage in the second working phase?  
Not at all    Very much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4.6. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 99
 
For the following questions please indicate to what extend the statements apply to you.  
1. It annoys me when others are undeservedly better off than I am.  
Does not apply at 
all 
   
Applies very 
much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
2. I feel guilty when I am undeservedly better off than others.  
Does not apply at 
all 
   
Applies very 
much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
3. If someone harms me on purpose, I will try to repay that person with the same coin, even if 
it costs me something.  
Does not apply at 
all 
   
Applies very 
much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. If someone does me a favour, I am willing to reciprocate it. 
Does not apply at 
all 
   
Applies very 
much  
□ □ □ □ □ 
5. I like to compete with others.  
Does not apply at 
all 
   
Applies very 
much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
6.  Generally, it is important to me to be the best.  
Does not apply at 
all 
   
Applies very 
much 
□ □ □ □ □ 
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Thank you very much for your time and participation!  
If you have any further comments on this experiment, do not hesitate to note it here:  
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Additional Regressions Experiment
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0.1.
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